USNI Proceedings Magazine
Issue: October 2007 Vol. 133/10/1,256

The Osprey Goes to War
By Richard Whittle

After a tumultuous quarter-century in development, the Marines' V-22
tiltrotor aircraft is ready to fly combat missions in Iraq.

The Marines start learning in October whether the cost of fielding
their top aviation priority-24 years, $22 billion, 30 lives, and
unrelenting criticism-was worth it. The V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft
is going into battle.

As this issue of Proceedings went to press in late September, the
first operational squadron of Ospreys-Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron
263 out of Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina-was due
at al Asad air base for a scheduled seven-month deployment. VMM-263
was to start flying combat missions in October.

The first operational use of the Osprey could help settle a debate
that has raged for years about the safety, survivability, reliability,
utility, and value of the helicopter-airplane hybrid. Grounded for 17
months after two fatal crashes in 2000, the Osprey has been re-
engineered and retested over the past seven years, but critics still
insist the V-22 is too fragile and vulnerable for Iraq.

A report issued this year by the Center for Defense Information, a
Washington think tank often critical of the Defense Department, said
the V-22 was "poised to reveal fundamental design flaws that may cost
even more lives."

Marines who fly and maintain the Osprey, Marine Corps leaders, and
officials in the V-22 program couldn't disagree more. The MV-22B
version that VMM-263 will fly in Iraq still has numerous maintenance
"gripes," as mechanics call them, but hasn't experienced the hydraulic
line chafing and other problems of earlier models. It's a different
aircraft, they say.

Ready to Go

"It is not a science experiment, it's a fielded aircraft," VMM-263's
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Rock, told reporters at a V-22
media day at the Quantico, Virginia, Marine base last spring. "The
people who fly the plane, we have families. We wouldn't be flying
something that we thought was going to kill us."

Ospreys flown by the Marines and Naval Air Systems Command's test
squadron, VMX-22, have logged more than 26,000 flight hours without a
serious mishap since the V-22 returned to flight in May 2002, NAVAIR
program spokesman James Darcy said.

During a 36-day deployment-for-training to Marine Corps Air Station
Yuma, Arizona, VMM-263 flew 631 hours and made all 72 scheduled
sorties during Desert Talon combat exercises.

Major General Kenneth Glueck, commander of 2d Marine Air Wing, said
during an impromptu interview as he visited VMM-263 at New River in
August that he expects the V-22 to "add great combat capability to the
Marine air-ground task force that we have in place over there today.
It's truly a transformational capability."

Built by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. of Fort Worth, Texas, and Boeing
Co.'s helicopter division in Ridley Park, Pennsylvania, the Osprey
tilts two huge wingtip rotors upward to take off and land like a
helicopter and swivels them forward to fly like a fixed-wing aircraft.
That gives it about twice the speed and up to four times the range of
the 1960s-era CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters the Marines are buying 360
Ospreys to replace.

Hot LZs

"Definitely it'll be less vulnerable when you start talking about en
route portions of the flight," Glueck said. "They take off from the
zone and they fly to high altitudes, where they're outside the weapons
engagement envelopes."

The Osprey cruises at about 230 knots, roughly 265 mph, and the CH-46
at 110 knots, or just over 125 mph.

Critics have contended that the Osprey must come into landing zones
slowly and will be especially vulnerable in hot LZs. Pilots and others
say that's a misimpression.

"I don't think it's going to be any more vulnerable than the 46 or the
53," Glueck said. A CH-46 can "usually come into a zone a little bit
quicker than the 53s. The V-22 is kind of in between the two."

The V-22 will have fighter or helicopter gunship escorts when going
into zones where there's a known threat, Glueck said, and the Marines
have mounted a 7.62-caliber M240G machine gun on the rear ramp. The
Osprey also has chaff dispensers, infrared suppressors, and electronic
defenses.

The Marine version of the Osprey, the MV-22, currently costs $69.3
million to $110 million per aircraft, depending on whether all program
costs are averaged into the price, NAVAIR spokesman Darcy said. The
Air Force is buying 50 CV-22 Ospreys packed with special operations
gear that raises the "flyaway" cost to $86 million.

Death in the Desert

V-22 supporters point out that the Osprey actually suffered fewer
crashes in development than did many other aircraft when they were
experimental. But much of the controversy over the V-22 stems from an
operational test in April 2000 at Marana, Arizona, in which one of the
earliest versions of the Osprey crashed while carrying a crew of four
and 15 Marine infantrymen in the back. All were killed.

An investigation blamed the crash on "vortex ring state," a phenomenon
in which a rotor that descends too quickly into its own downwash can
stop producing lift. The V-22 that crashed at Marana descended as much
as three times faster than the flight manual limit of 800 feet per
minute at speeds of less than 40 knots, the investigation found.

All Ospreys were grounded for 17 months after another crash in
December 2000 at New River in which an hydraulic leak and a software
glitch in the flight-control computer combined to bring down a V-22
flying in airplane mode, killing the crew of four.

A blue-ribbon commission appointed by the Pentagon in 2001 concluded
there was no evidence to support contentions that tiltrotor technology
was fatally flawed, as some critics had charged.

Bell-Boeing later re-engineered the layout of electrical and hydraulic
lines whose close proximity was found to be the cause of hydraulic
leaks. Company test pilots also made numerous flights trying to put
the V-22 into vortex ring state at high altitude. They found that,
with sufficient warning and altitude, an Osprey pilot could escape
vortex ring state simply by tilting the rotors forward and flying out
of the downwash.

Following those tests, NAVAIR added a warning tone and warning light
to the V-22 to alert pilots when an Osprey is bordering on vortex ring
state.

The V-22's troubled past has left many Marines wary of riding in the
aircraft, but VMM-263 and the Corps' other Osprey squadrons have been
giving familiarization rides to various Marine and Army units. After
two such flights in July for 2d Battalion/24th Marines, a Reserve unit
in Chicago, VMM-263 received a letter from the battalion commander
saying, "VMM-263 has turned 2/24 from Osprey doubters to Osprey
supporters."

Cheney Tried to Cancel

Critics who say the tiltrotor is too costly have long contended that
the Marines should have given up on the V-22 and instead bought
cheaper helicopters for the medium-assault mission. The Osprey
originally was supposed to go into service in 1991, eight years after
it was begun, and cost about $20 billion for a program expected to
produce 1,086 aircraft for all four armed services. The projected cost
for the 410 Ospreys now in service or being built is more than $54
billion, including the money spent on development. When he was Defense
Secretary in 1989, Vice President Dick Cheney tried to cancel the
Osprey, giving up only after a four-year political battle with the
Marines and V-22 backers in Congress.

The alternative most often proposed has been a combination of UH-60
Black Hawks to carry up to 11 Marines at a time and CH-53 Sea Stallion
heavy-lift choppers to haul cargo, both built by Sikorsky Aircraft
Corp. The Marines have steadfastly insisted they need the speed and
payload of the Osprey, whose cabin is sized to carry 24 fully combat-
loaded Marines or 12 litters for casualties.

The Marines' and NAVAIR's greater concern during final preparations
for the Iraq deployment was a list of maintenance problems, including
malfunctions of the Osprey's de-icing gear, high failure rates of "air
cycle machines" that cool the cockpit and avionics, cracks in panels
that cover the infrared suppressors, fuel system leaks, and more minor
problems. Those issues were highlighted in a June message from 2d
Marine Air Wing's aviation logistics department to the Osprey fleet
discussing steps needed to cope with the maintenance deficiencies.

NAVAIR and the Marines said measures to resolve all the issues in the
memo had been dealt with or fixes were under way by mid-summer, and a
Bell-Boeing team of technicians worked feverishly at New River before
VMM-263 left to install modifications to the squadron's Ospreys.

Bell-Boeing also was sending 14 technicians to Iraq with VMM-263 and
engine-maker Rolls Royce was dispatching two more to help the
squadron's mechanics and technicians. The companies and NAVAIR also
have taken pains to provide extra stockpiles of spare parts to support
VMM-263 in Iraq, and the Marines have given the squadron first claim
on parts and personnel, in some cases taking them from the two other
operational V-22 squadrons.

The de-icing issue was a major factor in a decision to send the
squadron's aircraft and crews to the eastern Mediterranean aboard the
USS Wasp (LHD-1) amphibious assault ship and have them fly into Iraq
from there rather than "self-deploy" by flying all the way with aerial
refueling.

The rejected plan to self-deploy would have sent the squadron of ten
Ospreys and six to eight KC-130 tankers across the north Atlantic with
five stops along the way. Even in summer, aircraft flying that route
can suffer icing after they fly through clouds.

One of two Ospreys that flew a similar route to the July 2006
Farnborough International Airshow in England made a precautionary
landing in Iceland after ice caused compressor stalls in one of its
engines.

Avoiding Wear and Tear

The Marines have often advertised the Osprey's ability to self-deploy,
and VMM-263 practiced for it with two transcontinental deployments for
training during its workup for Iraq. But maintenance officers and NCOs
were pleased with the decision to go by ship, saying it would reduce
wear and tear on the aircraft and ease their workload on arrival at al
Asad.

The de-icing problems shouldn't affect operations in Iraq, pilots
said, but will result in all Ospreys being listed as partial mission
capable rather than full mission capable, affecting the aircraft's
readiness ratings.

NAVAIR V-22 program manager Colonel Matthew Mulhern said floating
rather than flying the V-22s to Iraq also made sense because of the
heavy demand for aerial tankers.

In Iraq, the MV-22Bs of VMM-263, a former CH-46 squadron that
transitioned to the tiltrotor in March 2006, are to transport troops
and cargo, evacuate casualties, and serve on standby for tactical
recovery of aircraft and personnel missions. VMM-263 will replace
HMH-362 out of Hawaii, a squadron of CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters,
an aging medium-lift version of the CH-53, whose later models are
heavy-lift aircraft.

The first test the Marines have chosen for the V-22 could hardly be
tougher. The broiling heat and swirling sand of Iraq have wreaked
havoc on military helicopters of all kinds, damaging rotor blades,
wearing out engines, and creating record backlogs at maintenance
depots back home.

"It's going to be hard work maintaining this airplane," program
manager Mulhern said. "It's hard work maintaining any airplane over
there."

The pilots and maintenance personnel of VMM-263, who spent 18 months
preparing and training for their Iraq deployment, are leaving New
River confident in their ability to perform their mission and only
somewhat distracted by the uncommon press and official attention paid
to the first deployment of the V-22.

Lieutenant Colonel Rock and a number of others in his squadron, whose
pilots include four lieutenant colonels and eight U.S. Naval Academy
graduates, are among the most experienced Osprey pilots in the Fleet.
A third or more of VMM-263's two dozen pilots and many of its roughly
160 enlisted personnel have previously deployed to Iraq.

Though Rock has flown the V-22 since before the program's darkest days
in 2000, he emphasized to members of his squadron that their job was
not to prove the V-22's value but to support Marines on the ground,
the same as if the unit were still flying CH-46s.

"The thing that I aspire to most with this airplane is that you not
say, 'That's a V-22 squadron,'" Rock said in an interview months
before VMM-263 departed. "We're medium-lift transport. (The Osprey)
happens to be our weapons system."

Mr. Whittle, longtime Pentagon correspondent of the Dallas Morning
News, is writing a book about the V-22 Osprey for Simon & Schuster.

Mike wrote:
> USNI Proceedings Magazine
> Issue: October 2007 Vol. 133/10/1,256
>
> The Osprey Goes to War
> By Richard Whittle
<SNIP>
> "I don't think it's going to be any more vulnerable than the 46 or the
> 53," Glueck said. A CH-46 can "usually come into a zone a little bit
> quicker than the 53s. The V-22 is kind of in between the two."

***
Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?


> The V-22 will have fighter or helicopter gunship escorts when going
> into zones where there's a known threat, Glueck said, and the Marines
> have mounted a 7.62-caliber M240G machine gun on the rear ramp. The
> Osprey also has chaff dispensers, infrared suppressors, and electronic
> defenses.
<SNIP>

If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
advantage over alternative modern helicopters..

Can the V-22 fly "like a plane" with the ramp down? At what penalty?

I know the CH47 has a MG on the rear ramp, but that's a wider, bigger
ramp.. How much of an obstruction is it for troops trying to get out in
a hot LZ?

If the V-22 can get out of the envelope of the ground weapons threat,
the escorting Cobras cannot.

So all of its fancy capabilities are moot.

Walt

On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> ***
> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?

Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
the survivability systems on the CH-46


> <SNIP>
>
> If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
> advantage over alternative modern helicopters..

Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.

BB

BlackBeard wrote:
> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
>> ***
>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>
> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> the survivability systems on the CH-46
>

Why not compare it to a conestoga wagon? that way it will look even
better!!Considering the incredible cost of the Osprey comparing it to an
antique helicopter that cost a fraction of the Osprey simply shows how
desperate its proponents really are.

Vince

BlackBeard wrote:
> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
>> ***
>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>
> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> the survivability systems on the CH-46
>
>
>> <SNIP>
>>
>> If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
>> advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
>
> Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
> the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.

Ships
Its the Marines
They are launched from ships
The same ships
Vince

BlackBeard wrote:
> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
>> ***
>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>
> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> the survivability systems on the CH-46
>
>
<SNIP>

At least the CH-46 gets to auto-rotate if hit...

And comparing the "brand new" V-22 with the CH-46 which is how old? (And
last up-graded?) says a lot for just how good the V-22 must be...

How does it compare with a modern military helicopter? Heck, how does it
compare in survivability with even a Blackhawk?

On Oct 1, 8:25 pm, Vince > wrote:
> BlackBeard wrote:
> > On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> >> ***
> >> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>
> > Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> > systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> > the survivability systems on the CH-46
>
> Why not compare it to a conestoga wagon? that way it will look even
> better!!Considering the incredible cost of the Osprey comparing it to an
> antique helicopter that cost a fraction of the Osprey simply shows how
> desperate its proponents really are.
>
> Vince

Because that would be hyperbole and doesn't belong in a discussion.
Kerryn replied to a paragraph that directly compared the
susceptability of the V-22 to the CH-46 and the -53. Then he directly
asked about the survivability. I responded to his question, nothing
else.
What was that comment you made in the past about showing your
students the fault in getting emotional in an argument/discussion?

BB

I guess everybody has some mountain to climb.
It's just fate whether you live in Kansas or Tibet...

On Oct 1, 10:41 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> BlackBeard wrote:
> > On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> >> ***
> >> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>
> > Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> > systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> > the survivability systems on the CH-46
>
>
> And comparing the "brand new" V-22 with the CH-46 which is how old? (And
> last up-graded?) says a lot for just how good the V-22 must be...
>

It was in response to your question about survivability, which
directly followed a paragraph comparing the susceptability comparison
between the -22,-46,-53.

> How does it compare with a modern military helicopter? Heck, how does it
> compare in survivability with even a Blackhawk?

Can't speak for the Blackhawk (Army) but we did perform tests on the
upgrades for the Seahawk, Cobra, Sea Stallion, and UH-1Y and Z.
Similar systems and component technology that are original equipment
in the V-22, have been retro-fitted into the upgrades for those
(previously listed) platforms.

BB

I guess everybody has some mountain to climb.
It's just fate whether you live in Kansas or Tibet...

BlackBeard wrote:
> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> > ***
> > Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>
> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> the survivability systems on the CH-46
>
>
> > <SNIP>
> >
> > If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
> > advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
>
> Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
> the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.
>
> BB

Is the Cobra really the only possible escort?
I'm thinking that the AV-8 could do a pretty decent job during the
high speed transit phase.

Roger

> > If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
> > advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
>
> Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
> the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.
>
> BB

Saying that the V-22 will rendesvous with the Cobras at the LZ
violates the KISS principle. And it is just ridiculous on its face.

It is saying that we can predict what the enemy will do and that is
always nuts. No one can guarantee that there won't be a threat en
route. It is just nuts to plan that way.

And STILL it means that the V-22's operational radius is no greater
than the Cobra escorts.

The concept of the V-22 was flawed from the first day it was discussed
for carrying grunts. It is the best (or worst) example of the
Military-Industrial-Complex I know.

Walt

On Oct 2, 2:48?am, Roger Conroy > wrote:
> BlackBeard wrote:
> > On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> > > ***
> > > Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>
> > Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> > systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> > the survivability systems on the CH-46
>
> > > <SNIP>
>
> > > If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
> > > advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
>
> > Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
> > the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.
>
> > BB
>
> Is the Cobra really the only possible escort?
> I'm thinking that the AV-8 could do a pretty decent job during the
> high speed transit phase.
>
> Roger- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

AV-8's go too fast to really see what is on the ground. An AV-8 can't
supress a treeline the way a Cobra can.

I recall reading in the Marine Corps Gazette back in the early 1980's
what you've seen me post:

1. Doesn't matter what the range and speed of the V-22 is. It is
limited to the range and speed of the escorts

2. The V-22 needs guns of its own, and not one that fires backwards
either. If the rotors are tilted forward then no door gunner can get
a useful firing arc forward due to the arc of the rotors.

3. A chin turret was discussed (being the only reasonable option) but
that was eliminated due to cost.

I remember seeing this info in the MCG about 25 years ago.

The freaking thing is a grotesque boondoggle. It will never be
anything else.

I posted a video of a V-22 crash and some of the info I am posting now
on the website togetherweserved.com, which is for Marines only, and I
was banned within 24 hours.

Walt

Walt > writes:

>> > If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
>> > advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
>>
>> Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
>> the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.
>>
>> BB
>
> Saying that the V-22 will rendesvous with the Cobras at the LZ
> violates the KISS principle. And it is just ridiculous on its face.
>
> It is saying that we can predict what the enemy will do and that is
> always nuts. No one can guarantee that there won't be a threat en
> route. It is just nuts to plan that way.
>
> And STILL it means that the V-22's operational radius is no greater
> than the Cobra escorts.
>
> The concept of the V-22 was flawed from the first day it was discussed
> for carrying grunts. It is the best (or worst) example of the
> Military-Industrial-Complex I know.

Hmm, in practice the way to analyse a system (whether a military, or
financial trading system) where the future is never known but is bet
on anyway because the alternative is to stand aside and do nothing, is
to see how it performs under worst-case conditions. That predicates
that the "best" system is never the most optimized one, but one which
is crude (a relative word, to be sure) but robust. The V-22 I cannot
judge given the information available, but it appears to be more of a
niche system, rather than one which will be used in every situation
where transport is needed. At least, with the current state of
technology. But as I said, I cannot judge...
--
Gernot Hassenpflug

BlackBeard wrote:
> On Oct 1, 8:25 pm, Vince > wrote:
>> BlackBeard wrote:
>>> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
>>>> ***
>>>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>>> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
>>> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
>>> the survivability systems on the CH-46
>> Why not compare it to a conestoga wagon? that way it will look even
>> better!!Considering the incredible cost of the Osprey comparing it to an
>> antique helicopter that cost a fraction of the Osprey simply shows how
>> desperate its proponents really are.
>>
>> Vince
>
> Because that would be hyperbole and doesn't belong in a discussion.
> Kerryn replied to a paragraph that directly compared the
> susceptability of the V-22 to the CH-46 and the -53. Then he directly
> asked about the survivability. I responded to his question, nothing
> else.
> What was that comment you made in the past about showing your
> students the fault in getting emotional in an argument/discussion?
>
> BB

There is no emotion in my comment at all. I was simply pointing out hat
the comparison was meaningless.

Vince

Walt wrote:
> On Oct 2, 2:48?am, Roger Conroy > wrote:
>> BlackBeard wrote:
>>> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
>>>> ***
>>>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>>> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
>>> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
>>> the survivability systems on the CH-46
>>>> <SNIP>
>>>> If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
>>>> advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
>>> Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
>>> the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.
>>> BB
>> Is the Cobra really the only possible escort?
>> I'm thinking that the AV-8 could do a pretty decent job during the
>> high speed transit phase.
>>
>> Roger- Hide quoted text -
>>
>> - Show quoted text -
>
> AV-8's go too fast to really see what is on the ground. An AV-8 can't
> supress a treeline the way a Cobra can.
>
> I recall reading in the Marine Corps Gazette back in the early 1980's
> what you've seen me post:
>
> 1. Doesn't matter what the range and speed of the V-22 is. It is
> limited to the range and speed of the escorts
>
> 2. The V-22 needs guns of its own, and not one that fires backwards
> either. If the rotors are tilted forward then no door gunner can get
> a useful firing arc forward due to the arc of the rotors.
>
> 3. A chin turret was discussed (being the only reasonable option) but
> that was eliminated due to cost.
>
> I remember seeing this info in the MCG about 25 years ago.
>
> The freaking thing is a grotesque boondoggle. It will never be
> anything else.
>
> I posted a video of a V-22 crash and some of the info I am posting now
> on the website togetherweserved.com, which is for Marines only, and I
> was banned within 24 hours.
>
> Walt
>

The chin turret is not just a question of cost. It uses about 10-15% of
the already small payload and also "unbalances" the aircraft

Vince

On Oct 2, 5:20 am, Walt > wrote:
> On Oct 2, 2:48?am, Roger Conroy > wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > BlackBeard wrote:
> > > On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> > > > ***
> > > > Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>
> > > Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> > > systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> > > the survivability systems on the CH-46
>
> > > > <SNIP>
>
> > > > If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
> > > > advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
>
> > > Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
> > > the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.
>
> > > BB
>
> > Is the Cobra really the only possible escort?
> > I'm thinking that the AV-8 could do a pretty decent job during the
> > high speed transit phase.
>
> > Roger- Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> AV-8's go too fast to really see what is on the ground. An AV-8 can't
> supress a treeline the way a Cobra can.
>
> I recall reading in the Marine Corps Gazette back in the early 1980's
> what you've seen me post:
>
> 1. Doesn't matter what the range and speed of the V-22 is. It is
> limited to the range and speed of the escorts

I'm not really sure why you think the Cobras will slow the V-22s
down...operationally, it would be idiocy for the troop carriers to
arrive over the battlefield at the same time as the gunships, since
you want the gunships (and Harriers, to boot) to have arrived overhead
and begun destroying targets and softening the LZ well before the
larger birds are in the threat zone. If you've got troop carriers, be
they CH-46s, Blackhawks, or V-22s cruising in looking for a place to
land WHILE the first wave of Cobras is coming in, then it doesn't
matter what airframe you're in, the bad guys will target the low,
slow, fat with Marines birds and hope they can kill those before the
snakes spot them.

But with the increased speed of the V-22s, they can make more trips
between the boat or base and the LZ in the same amount of time, which
means more boots getting on the ground while the enemy is still
recovering from the gunships' attention. Let the Cobras and Harriers
come and go as fuel and weapons are expended...there will be enough
that one flight can always be hitting the target zone while others are
en route to or from the launch point.

"Walt" > wrote in message
ps.com...
>
> The freaking thing is a grotesque boondoggle. It will never be
> anything else.
>
> I posted a video of a V-22 crash and some of the info I am posting now
> on the website togetherweserved.com, which is for Marines only, and I
> was banned within 24 hours.

The interesting thing is, my brother, who is a Marine Corporal and veteran
of two tours, has seen Ospreys in Iraq and on a ship in the Gulf.

-c

BlackBeard wrote:
> On Oct 1, 10:41 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
>> BlackBeard wrote:
>>> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
>>>> ***
>>>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>>> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
>>> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
>>> the survivability systems on the CH-46
>>
>> And comparing the "brand new" V-22 with the CH-46 which is how old? (And
>> last up-graded?) says a lot for just how good the V-22 must be...
>>
>
> It was in response to your question about survivability, which
> directly followed a paragraph comparing the susceptability comparison
> between the -22,-46,-53.

***
It wasn't a dig at your response.. Just at the fact that the comparisons
are always V-22 against the CH-46...

>
>> How does it compare with a modern military helicopter? Heck, how does it
>> compare in survivability with even a Blackhawk?
>
> Can't speak for the Blackhawk (Army) but we did perform tests on the
> upgrades for the Seahawk, Cobra, Sea Stallion, and UH-1Y and Z.
> Similar systems and component technology that are original equipment
> in the V-22, have been retro-fitted into the upgrades for those
> (previously listed) platforms.
>

***
So it comes down to the ability to auto rotate versus lack of that
ability (Once you get hit...)?

"Kerryn Offord" > wrote in message
...
> Mike wrote:
>> USNI Proceedings Magazine
>> Issue: October 2007 Vol. 133/10/1,256
>>
>> The Osprey Goes to War
>> By Richard Whittle
> <SNIP>
>> "I don't think it's going to be any more vulnerable than the 46 or the
>> 53," Glueck said. A CH-46 can "usually come into a zone a little bit
>> quicker than the 53s. The V-22 is kind of in between the two."
>
> ***
> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>
>
>> The V-22 will have fighter or helicopter gunship escorts when going
>> into zones where there's a known threat, Glueck said, and the Marines
>> have mounted a 7.62-caliber M240G machine gun on the rear ramp. The
>> Osprey also has chaff dispensers, infrared suppressors, and electronic
>> defenses.
> <SNIP>
>
> If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed advantage
> over alternative modern helicopters..
>
> Can the V-22 fly "like a plane" with the ramp down? At what penalty?
>
> I know the CH47 has a MG on the rear ramp, but that's a wider, bigger
> ramp.. How much of an obstruction is it for troops trying to get out in a
> hot LZ?

I imagine (would guess) there is an airspeed limit with the ramp down (gun
in place to be fired),
probably in the range of 175 to 130 knots, above that the ramp would have
to be up at least level
to keep it from acting like a stabilator and pushing the nose down.

Remember this is an aircraft with it's center of gravity at the wing.

The CH-47 has 3 Machine guns mounted on it, one in the right door , one
in the left forward window,
and one on the ramp. 160th SOAR CH-47's use miniguns in the forward
stations, and an M2 .50 Cal on the ramp floor.

On the CH-47 the ramp gun can be quickly removed using a quick disconnect
mount.

The ramp gun on the MV-22 is side mounted on a 2 piece flex mount, and it
can be quickly swung to the right side out of the
way of troops exiting the aircraft, after pulling a quick release lock.


Helomech

Paul wrote:
> "Kerryn Offord" > wrote in message
> ...
>> Mike wrote:
>>> USNI Proceedings Magazine
>>> Issue: October 2007 Vol. 133/10/1,256
>>>
>>> The Osprey Goes to War
>>> By Richard Whittle
>> <SNIP>
>>> "I don't think it's going to be any more vulnerable than the 46 or the
>>> 53," Glueck said. A CH-46 can "usually come into a zone a little bit
>>> quicker than the 53s. The V-22 is kind of in between the two."
>> ***
>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>>
>>
>>> The V-22 will have fighter or helicopter gunship escorts when going
>>> into zones where there's a known threat, Glueck said, and the Marines
>>> have mounted a 7.62-caliber M240G machine gun on the rear ramp. The
>>> Osprey also has chaff dispensers, infrared suppressors, and electronic
>>> defenses.
>> <SNIP>
>>
>> If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed advantage
>> over alternative modern helicopters..
>>
>> Can the V-22 fly "like a plane" with the ramp down? At what penalty?
>>
>> I know the CH47 has a MG on the rear ramp, but that's a wider, bigger
>> ramp.. How much of an obstruction is it for troops trying to get out in a
>> hot LZ?
>
> I imagine (would guess) there is an airspeed limit with the ramp down (gun
> in place to be fired),
> probably in the range of 175 to 130 knots, above that the ramp would have
> to be up at least level
> to keep it from acting like a stabilator and pushing the nose down.
>
> Remember this is an aircraft with it's center of gravity at the wing.
>
> The CH-47 has 3 Machine guns mounted on it, one in the right door , one
> in the left forward window,
> and one on the ramp. 160th SOAR CH-47's use miniguns in the forward
> stations, and an M2 .50 Cal on the ramp floor.
>
> On the CH-47 the ramp gun can be quickly removed using a quick disconnect
> mount.
>
> The ramp gun on the MV-22 is side mounted on a 2 piece flex mount, and it
> can be quickly swung to the right side out of the
> way of troops exiting the aircraft, after pulling a quick release lock.
>
>
> Helomech
>


Thank you.

On Oct 2, 5:14?pm, Typhoon502 > wrote:
> On Oct 2, 5:20 am, Walt > wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 2, 2:48?am, Roger Conroy > wrote:
>
> > > BlackBeard wrote:
> > > > On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> > > > > ***
> > > > > Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>
> > > > Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> > > > systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> > > > the survivability systems on the CH-46
>
> > > > > <SNIP>
>
> > > > > If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
> > > > > advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
>
> > > > Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
> > > > the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.
>
> > > > BB
>
> > > Is the Cobra really the only possible escort?
> > > I'm thinking that the AV-8 could do a pretty decent job during the
> > > high speed transit phase.
>
> > > Roger- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > AV-8's go too fast to really see what is on the ground. An AV-8 can't
> > supress a treeline the way a Cobra can.
>
> > I recall reading in the Marine Corps Gazette back in the early 1980's
> > what you've seen me post:
>
> > 1. Doesn't matter what the range and speed of the V-22 is. It is
> > limited to the range and speed of the escorts
>
> I'm not really sure why you think the Cobras will slow the V-22s
> down...operationally, it would be idiocy for the troop carriers to
> arrive over the battlefield at the same time as the gunships, since
> you want the gunships (and Harriers, to boot) to have arrived overhead
> and begun destroying targets and softening the LZ well before the
> larger birds are in the threat zone. If you've got troop carriers, be
> they CH-46s, Blackhawks, or V-22s cruising in looking for a place to
> land WHILE the first wave of Cobras is coming in, then it doesn't
> matter what airframe you're in, the bad guys will target the low,
> slow, fat with Marines birds and hope they can kill those before the
> snakes spot them.
>
> But with the increased speed of the V-22s, they can make more trips
> between the boat or base and the LZ in the same amount of time, which
> means more boots getting on the ground while the enemy is still
> recovering from the gunships' attention. Let the Cobras and Harriers
> come and go as fuel and weapons are expended...there will be enough
> that one flight can always be hitting the target zone while others are
> en route to or from the launch point.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

That is mostly good info, thanks.

1. The Osprey is still limited to how far from the boat/field the
Cobras can go.

2. It is a violation of basic common sense to think they can zip
around at no escorts. Maybe that is how the Marines rationalized
buying the damn thing. But that would be, yes, why they are limited
to the speed of the Cobra. You need en route escorts.

3. Referencing the above, saying that the Ospreys can zip around with
no escorts makes plans based on assumptions versus capabilities. That
is what the Japs did at Midway. They made plans based on how they
thought the Amercians -would- react, not based on how they -could-
react.

This is how the epitaph of the MV-22 should read:

"Finally cancelled due to common sense"

Walt

Walt wrote:
> On Oct 2, 5:14?pm, Typhoon502 > wrote:
>> On Oct 2, 5:20 am, Walt > wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Oct 2, 2:48?am, Roger Conroy > wrote:
>>>> BlackBeard wrote:
>>>>> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
>>>>>> ***
>>>>>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>>>>> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
>>>>> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
>>>>> the survivability systems on the CH-46
>>>>>> <SNIP>
>>>>>> If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
>>>>>> advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
>>>>> Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
>>>>> the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.
>>>>> BB
>>>> Is the Cobra really the only possible escort?
>>>> I'm thinking that the AV-8 could do a pretty decent job during the
>>>> high speed transit phase.
>>>> Roger- Hide quoted text -
>>>> - Show quoted text -
>>> AV-8's go too fast to really see what is on the ground. An AV-8 can't
>>> supress a treeline the way a Cobra can.
>>> I recall reading in the Marine Corps Gazette back in the early 1980's
>>> what you've seen me post:
>>> 1. Doesn't matter what the range and speed of the V-22 is. It is
>>> limited to the range and speed of the escorts
>> I'm not really sure why you think the Cobras will slow the V-22s
>> down...operationally, it would be idiocy for the troop carriers to
>> arrive over the battlefield at the same time as the gunships, since
>> you want the gunships (and Harriers, to boot) to have arrived overhead
>> and begun destroying targets and softening the LZ well before the
>> larger birds are in the threat zone. If you've got troop carriers, be
>> they CH-46s, Blackhawks, or V-22s cruising in looking for a place to
>> land WHILE the first wave of Cobras is coming in, then it doesn't
>> matter what airframe you're in, the bad guys will target the low,
>> slow, fat with Marines birds and hope they can kill those before the
>> snakes spot them.
>>
>> But with the increased speed of the V-22s, they can make more trips
>> between the boat or base and the LZ in the same amount of time, which
>> means more boots getting on the ground while the enemy is still
>> recovering from the gunships' attention. Let the Cobras and Harriers
>> come and go as fuel and weapons are expended...there will be enough
>> that one flight can always be hitting the target zone while others are
>> en route to or from the launch point.- Hide quoted text -
>>
>> - Show quoted text -
>
> That is mostly good info, thanks.
>
> 1. The Osprey is still limited to how far from the boat/field the
> Cobras can go.
{snip}

Assuming that the Cobras and Osprey come from the same boat. Also
that chick of Osprey does not have a longer range.


Andrew Swallow

> So it comes down to the ability to auto rotate versus lack of that
> ability (Once you get hit...)?- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

It is a confluence of things.

If you try and fly it without escorts you'll get hit. You'll need to
auto-rotate.

If you try and descend at a constant rate into a zone you'll get hit.
You'll need to auto-rotate.

If you don't have effective armament on the bird you'll get hit.
You'll need to auto-rotate.

So it is is ignoring these vulnerability factors and saying, "We'll
ignore even the modicum of survivabilty provided by auto-rotation."

The ability to auto-rotate was originally required, but it was
dropped.

I wonder how many retired Marines are making 2-3 times (or more) of
their retirement pay to work on this thing.

It is the poster child for problems with the Military-Industrial-
Complex of the type that Eisenhower warned about.

Walt

On Oct 4, 6:05?am, Andrew Swallow > wrote:
> Walt wrote:
> > On Oct 2, 5:14?pm, Typhoon502 > wrote:
> >> On Oct 2, 5:20 am, Walt > wrote:
>
> >>> On Oct 2, 2:48?am, Roger Conroy > wrote:
> >>>> BlackBeard wrote:
> >>>>> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> >>>>>> ***
> >>>>>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
> >>>>> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> >>>>> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> >>>>> the survivability systems on the CH-46
> >>>>>> <SNIP>
> >>>>>> If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
> >>>>>> advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
> >>>>> Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
> >>>>> the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.
> >>>>> BB
> >>>> Is the Cobra really the only possible escort?
> >>>> I'm thinking that the AV-8 could do a pretty decent job during the
> >>>> high speed transit phase.
> >>>> Roger- Hide quoted text -
> >>>> - Show quoted text -
> >>> AV-8's go too fast to really see what is on the ground. An AV-8 can't
> >>> supress a treeline the way a Cobra can.
> >>> I recall reading in the Marine Corps Gazette back in the early 1980's
> >>> what you've seen me post:
> >>> 1. Doesn't matter what the range and speed of the V-22 is. It is
> >>> limited to the range and speed of the escorts
> >> I'm not really sure why you think the Cobras will slow the V-22s
> >> down...operationally, it would be idiocy for the troop carriers to
> >> arrive over the battlefield at the same time as the gunships, since
> >> you want the gunships (and Harriers, to boot) to have arrived overhead
> >> and begun destroying targets and softening the LZ well before the
> >> larger birds are in the threat zone. If you've got troop carriers, be
> >> they CH-46s, Blackhawks, or V-22s cruising in looking for a place to
> >> land WHILE the first wave of Cobras is coming in, then it doesn't
> >> matter what airframe you're in, the bad guys will target the low,
> >> slow, fat with Marines birds and hope they can kill those before the
> >> snakes spot them.
>
> >> But with the increased speed of the V-22s, they can make more trips
> >> between the boat or base and the LZ in the same amount of time, which
> >> means more boots getting on the ground while the enemy is still
> >> recovering from the gunships' attention. Let the Cobras and Harriers
> >> come and go as fuel and weapons are expended...there will be enough
> >> that one flight can always be hitting the target zone while others are
> >> en route to or from the launch point.- Hide quoted text -
>
> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> > That is mostly good info, thanks.
>
> > 1. The Osprey is still limited to how far from the boat/field the
> > Cobras can go.
>
> {snip}
>
> Assuming that the Cobras and Osprey come from the same boat. Also
> that chick of Osprey does not have a longer range.
>
> Andrew Swallow- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Saying that the Osprey and Cobras can fly from different fields and
meet up violates the KISS rule. Their is a tremendous amount of
coordination involved in a troop lift. Implicit in what you are
saying is that the different units would not be able to attend the
same brief before they launch.

And I guess you are seeing a scenario where the Cobras have a base 50
miles inland and the MV-22's are maybe 50 miles out at sea -- then
they can comfortably reach the same distance inland.

Walt

Walt wrote:
[snip]

>
> And I guess you are seeing a scenario where the Cobras have a base 50
> miles inland and the MV-22's are maybe 50 miles out at sea -- then
> they can comfortably reach the same distance inland.
>
> Walt
>

I was thinking more of the situation where the the helicopters
were coming from a carrier (or destroyer) and the Ospreys were
coming form a marine transport ship. Fleet actions frequently
involve more than 1 ship and land artillery finds it difficult to
hit ships that are over the horizon because it cannot see them.

Andrew Swallow

On Oct 4, 6:12 am, Walt > wrote:

> Saying that the Osprey and Cobras can fly from different fields and
> meet up violates the KISS rule. Their is a tremendous amount of
> coordination involved in a troop lift. Implicit in what you are
> saying is that the different units would not be able to attend the
> same brief before they launch.

And yet different aircraft types all over the world fly from different
fields and meet up in a point in space and time daily. You're so
focused on making things fit the KISS rule that you're overlooking the
reality of combat aviation for the past...oh, let's be generous and
say 50 years. That's about how long routine air-to-air refueling has
been occurring, right?

On Oct 1, 4:33 pm, Mike > wrote:
> USNI Proceedings Magazine
> Issue: October 2007 Vol. 133/10/1,256
>
> The Osprey Goes to War
> By Richard Whittle
>
> After a tumultuous quarter-century in development, the Marines' V-22
> tiltrotor aircraft is ready to fly combat missions in Iraq.
>
> The Marines start learning in October whether the cost of fielding
> their top aviation priority-24 years, $22 billion, 30 lives, and
> unrelenting criticism-was worth it. The V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft
> is going into battle.
>
> As this issue of Proceedings went to press in late September, the
> first operational squadron of Ospreys-Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron
> 263 out of Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina-was due
> at al Asad air base for a scheduled seven-month deployment. VMM-263
> was to start flying combat missions in October.
>
> The first operational use of the Osprey could help settle a debate
> that has raged for years about the safety, survivability, reliability,
> utility, and value of the helicopter-airplane hybrid. Grounded for 17
> months after two fatal crashes in 2000, the Osprey has been re-
> engineered and retested over the past seven years, but critics still
> insist the V-22 is too fragile and vulnerable for Iraq.
>
> A report issued this year by the Center for Defense Information, a
> Washington think tank often critical of the Defense Department, said
> the V-22 was "poised to reveal fundamental design flaws that may cost
> even more lives."
>
> Marines who fly and maintain the Osprey, Marine Corps leaders, and
> officials in the V-22 program couldn't disagree more. The MV-22B
> version that VMM-263 will fly in Iraq still has numerous maintenance
> "gripes," as mechanics call them, but hasn't experienced the hydraulic
> line chafing and other problems of earlier models. It's a different
> aircraft, they say.
>
> Ready to Go
>
> "It is not a science experiment, it's a fielded aircraft," VMM-263's
> commander, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Rock, told reporters at a V-22
> media day at the Quantico, Virginia, Marine base last spring. "The
> people who fly the plane, we have families. We wouldn't be flying
> something that we thought was going to kill us."
>
> Ospreys flown by the Marines and Naval Air Systems Command's test
> squadron, VMX-22, have logged more than 26,000 flight hours without a
> serious mishap since the V-22 returned to flight in May 2002, NAVAIR
> program spokesman James Darcy said.
>
> During a 36-day deployment-for-training to Marine Corps Air Station
> Yuma, Arizona, VMM-263 flew 631 hours and made all 72 scheduled
> sorties during Desert Talon combat exercises.
>
> Major General Kenneth Glueck, commander of 2d Marine Air Wing, said
> during an impromptu interview as he visited VMM-263 at New River in
> August that he expects the V-22 to "add great combat capability to the
> Marine air-ground task force that we have in place over there today.
> It's truly a transformational capability."
>
> Built by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. of Fort Worth, Texas, and Boeing
> Co.'s helicopter division in Ridley Park, Pennsylvania, the Osprey
> tilts two huge wingtip rotors upward to take off and land like a
> helicopter and swivels them forward to fly like a fixed-wing aircraft.
> That gives it about twice the speed and up to four times the range of
> the 1960s-era CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters the Marines are buying 360
> Ospreys to replace.
>
> Hot LZs
>
> "Definitely it'll be less vulnerable when you start talking about en
> route portions of the flight," Glueck said. "They take off from the
> zone and they fly to high altitudes, where they're outside the weapons
> engagement envelopes."
>
> The Osprey cruises at about 230 knots, roughly 265 mph, and the CH-46
> at 110 knots, or just over 125 mph.
>
> Critics have contended that the Osprey must come into landing zones
> slowly and will be especially vulnerable in hot LZs. Pilots and others
> say that's a misimpression.
>
> "I don't think it's going to be any more vulnerable than the 46 or the
> 53," Glueck said. A CH-46 can "usually come into a zone a little bit
> quicker than the 53s. The V-22 is kind of in between the two."
>
> The V-22 will have fighter or helicopter gunship escorts when going
> into zones where there's a known threat, Glueck said, and the Marines
> have mounted a 7.62-caliber M240G machine gun on the rear ramp. The
> Osprey also has chaff dispensers, infrared suppressors, and electronic
> defenses.
>
> The Marine version of the Osprey, the MV-22, currently costs $69.3
> million to $110 million per aircraft, depending on whether all program
> costs are averaged into the price, NAVAIR spokesman Darcy said. The
> Air Force is buying 50 CV-22 Ospreys packed with special operations
> gear that raises the "flyaway" cost to $86 million.
>
> Death in the Desert
>
> V-22 supporters point out that the Osprey actually suffered fewer
> crashes in development than did many other aircraft when they were
> experimental. But much of the controversy over the V-22 stems from an
> operational test in April 2000 at Marana, Arizona, in which one of the
> earliest versions of the Osprey crashed while carrying a crew of four
> and 15 Marine infantrymen in the back. All were killed.
>
> An investigation blamed the crash on "vortex ring state," a phenomenon
> in which a rotor that descends too quickly into its own downwash can
> stop producing lift. The V-22 that crashed at Marana descended as much
> as three times faster than the flight manual limit of 800 feet per
> minute at speeds of less than 40 knots, the investigation found.
>
> All Ospreys were grounded for 17 months after another crash in
> December 2000 at New River in which an hydraulic leak and a software
> glitch in the flight-control computer combined to bring down a V-22
> flying in airplane mode, killing the crew of four.
>
> A blue-ribbon commission appointed by the Pentagon in 2001 concluded
> there was no evidence to support contentions that tiltrotor technology
> was fatally flawed, as some critics had charged.
>
> Bell-Boeing later re-engineered the layout of electrical and hydraulic
> lines whose close proximity was found to be the cause of hydraulic
> leaks. Company test pilots also made numerous flights trying to put
> the V-22 into vortex ring state at high altitude. They found that,
> with sufficient warning and altitude, an Osprey pilot could escape
> vortex ring state simply by tilting the rotors forward and flying out
> of the downwash.
>
> Following those tests, NAVAIR added a warning tone and warning light
> to the V-22 to alert pilots when an Osprey is bordering on vortex ring
> state.
>
> The V-22's troubled past has left many Marines wary of riding in the
> aircraft, but VMM-263 and the Corps' other Osprey squadrons have been
> giving familiarization rides to various Marine and Army units. After
> two such flights in July for 2d Battalion/24th Marines, a Reserve unit
> in Chicago, VMM-263 received a letter from the battalion commander
> saying, "VMM-263 has turned 2/24 from Osprey doubters to Osprey
> supporters."
>
> Cheney Tried to Cancel
>
> Critics who say the tiltrotor is too costly have long contended that
> the Marines should have given up on the V-22 and instead bought
> cheaper helicopters for the medium-assault mission. The Osprey
> originally was supposed to go into service in 1991, eight years after
> it was begun, and cost about $20 billion for a program expected to
> produce 1,086 aircraft for all four armed services. The projected cost
> for the 410 Ospreys now in service or being built is more than $54
> billion, including the money spent on development. When he was Defense
> Secretary in 1989, Vice President Dick Cheney tried to cancel the
> Osprey, giving up only after a four-year political battle with the
> Marines and V-22 backers in Congress.
>
> The alternative most often proposed has been a combination of UH-60
> Black Hawks to carry up to 11 Marines at a time and CH-53 Sea Stallion
> heavy-lift choppers to haul cargo, both built by Sikorsky Aircraft
> Corp. The Marines have steadfastly insisted they need the speed and
> payload of the Osprey, whose cabin is sized to carry 24 fully combat-
> loaded Marines or 12 litters for casualties.
>
> The Marines' and NAVAIR's greater concern during final preparations
> for the Iraq deployment was a list of maintenance problems, including
> malfunctions of the Osprey's de-icing gear, high failure rates of "air
> cycle machines" that cool the cockpit and avionics, cracks in panels
> that cover the infrared suppressors, fuel system leaks, and more minor
> problems. Those issues were highlighted in a June message from 2d
> Marine Air Wing's aviation logistics department to the Osprey fleet
> discussing steps needed to cope with the maintenance deficiencies.
>
> NAVAIR and the Marines said measures to resolve all the issues in the
> memo had been dealt with or fixes were under way by mid-summer, and a
> Bell-Boeing team of technicians worked feverishly at New River before
> VMM-263 left to install modifications to the squadron's Ospreys.
>
> Bell-Boeing also was sending 14 technicians to Iraq with VMM-263 and
> engine-maker Rolls Royce was dispatching two more to help the
> squadron's mechanics and technicians. The companies and NAVAIR also
> have taken pains to provide extra stockpiles of spare parts to support
> VMM-263 in Iraq, and the Marines have given the squadron first claim
> on parts and personnel, in some cases taking them from the two other
> operational V-22 squadrons.
>
> The de-icing issue was a major factor in a decision to send the
> squadron's aircraft and crews to the eastern Mediterranean aboard the
> USS Wasp (LHD-1) amphibious assault ship and have them fly into Iraq
> from there rather than "self-deploy" by flying all the way with aerial
> refueling.
>
> The rejected plan to self-deploy would have sent the squadron of ten
> Ospreys and six to eight KC-130 tankers across the north Atlantic with
> five stops along the way. Even in summer, aircraft flying that route
> can suffer icing after they fly through clouds.
>
> One of two Ospreys that flew a similar route to the July 2006
> Farnborough International Airshow in England made a precautionary
> landing in Iceland after ice caused compressor stalls in one of its
> engines.
>
> Avoiding Wear and Tear
>
> The Marines ...
>
> read more »

The bucket made the cover of Time too.

http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1665835,00.html

Wednesday, Sep. 26, 2007
V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame
By Mark Thompson

It's hard to imagine an American weapons program so fraught with
problems that Dick Cheney would try repeatedly to cancel it - hard,
that is, until you get to know the Osprey. As Defense Secretary under
George H.W. Bush, Cheney tried four times to kill the Marine Corps's
ungainly tilt-rotor aircraft. Four times he failed. Cheney found the
arguments for the combat troop carrier unpersuasive and its problems
irredeemable. "Given the risk we face from a military standpoint,
given the areas where we think the priorities ought to be, the V-22 is
not at the top of the list," he told a Senate committee in 1989. "It
came out at the bottom of the list, and for that reason, I decided to
terminate it." But the Osprey proved impossible to kill, thanks to
lawmakers who rescued it from Cheney's ax time and again because of
the home-district money that came with it - and to the irresistible
notion that American engineers had found a way to improve on another
great aviation breakthrough, the helicopter.

Now the aircraft that flies like an airplane but takes off and lands
like a chopper is about to make its combat debut in Iraq. It has been
a long, strange trip: the V-22 has been 25 years in development, more
than twice as long as the Apollo program that put men on the moon.
V-22 crashes have claimed the lives of 30 men - 10 times the lunar
program's toll - all before the plane has seen combat. The Pentagon
has put $20 billion into the Osprey and expects to spend an additional
$35 billion before the program is finished. In exchange, the Marines,
Navy and Air Force will get 458 aircraft, averaging $119 million per
copy.

The saga of the V-22 - the battles over its future on Capitol Hill, a
performance record that is spotty at best, a long, determined quest by
the Marines to get what they wanted - demonstrates how Washington
works (or, rather, doesn't). It exposes the compromises that are made
when narrow interests collide with common sense. It is a tale that
shows how the system fails at its most significant task, by placing in
jeopardy those we count on to protect us. For even at a stratospheric
price, the V-22 is going into combat shorthanded. As a result of
decisions the Marine Corps made over the past decade, the aircraft
lacks a heavy-duty, forward-mounted machine gun to lay down
suppressing fire against forces that will surely try to shoot it down.
And if the plane's two engines are disabled by enemy fire or
mechanical trouble while it's hovering, the V-22 lacks a helicopter's
ability to coast roughly to the ground - something that often saved
lives in Vietnam. In 2002 the Marines abandoned the requirement that
the planes be capable of autorotating (as the maneuver is called),
with unpowered but spinning helicopter blades slowly letting the
aircraft land safely. That decision, a top Pentagon aviation
consultant wrote in a confidential 2003 report obtained by TIME, is
"unconscionable" for a wartime aircraft. "When everything goes wrong,
as it often does in a combat environment," he said, "autorotation is
all a helicopter pilot has to save his and his passengers' lives."

The Plane That Wouldn't Die

In many ways, the V-22 is a classic example of how large weapons
systems have been built in the U.S. since Dwight Eisenhower warned in
1961 of the "unwarranted influence" of "the military-industrial
complex." The Osprey has taken years to design, build, test and bring
to the field. All that time meant plenty of money for its prime
contractors, Bell Helicopter and the Boeing Co. As the plane took
shape and costs increased, some of its missions were shelved or
sidelined. And yet, with the U.S. spending almost $500 billion a year
on defense - not counting the nearly $200 billion annually for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan - there's plenty of money for
marginal or unnecessary programs. Pentagon reform and efficiency are
far less of a cause among lawmakers today than during the years of
Ronald Reagan's comparatively modest defense-spending boom. "Almost
every program the U.S. military is now buying takes longer to develop,
costs more than predicted and usually doesn't meet the original
specifications and requirements," says Gordon Adams, who oversaw
military spending for the Office of Management and Budget during Bill
Clinton's Administration.

The Marine Corps likes to boast that it spends only a nickel out of
every Pentagon dollar and makes do with cheaper weapons than the other
services. The story of the V-22 belies that image: It's a tale of how
a military service with little experience overseeing aircraft programs
has wound up with a plane that may be as notable for its shortcomings
as for its technological advances.

First, some history. Because Marines deploy aboard ships, the
service's chiefs have always hungered for vertical lift - aircraft
that could take off and land from small decks and fly far inland to
drop off combat-ready troops. As the Marines' Vietnam-era CH-46
choppers became obsolete, commanders started to dream of an aircraft
that would give them more options when considering an amphibious
assault. The dreams intensified following the failed Desert One
mission in 1980 to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran. In the course of the
operation, three helicopters broke down, leading to an order to abort
the entire endeavor, and a fourth chopper collided with a C-130
aircraft at a desert base, killing eight U.S. troops. That sent
Pentagon bureaucrats hunting for a transport that could be used by all
four military services and prevent another fiasco. Reagan, who took
office the year after Desert One, began to pour money into the
Pentagon, particularly for research and design into new weapons and
combat systems. The Osprey was born.

Originally, the program was designed to churn out the first of more
than 1,000 tilt-rotors in less than 10 years for $40 million each. But
this was no conventional plane. The Osprey may cruise like an
airplane, but it takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter. The
technical challenge of rotating an airplane's wings and engines in
midair led to delays, which in turn led to an ever higher price tag.
As expenses rose, the Pentagon cut the number of planes it wanted to
buy, which in turn increased the unit price. Citing rising costs, the
Army abandoned the project in 1983.

That left the relatively tiny Marine Corps footing most of the bill
for the project - the V-22 accounts for nearly 70% of its procurement
budget - and overseeing a program larger and more technically
challenging than any the service was accustomed to managing. Sensing
weakness at the Pentagon, congressional supporters, largely from the
V-22's key manufacturing states of Texas (Bell Helicopter) and
Pennsylvania (Boeing), created the Tilt-Rotor Technology Coalition to
keep the craft alive, despite Cheney's opposition. They were aided by
nearly 2,000 V-22 suppliers, in more than 40 states, who pressured
their lawmakers to stick with the program. And so, despite Cheney's
doubts, the Osprey survived.

By 1993, as the Osprey program approached its 12th birthday and Bill
Clinton became President, the Marines had spent $13 billion on the
planes. None were ready for war. In 1991 one of the first V-22s
crashed when taking off for its maiden flight - because of improper
wiring. A second crash killed seven in 1992. The Clinton Pentagon
stuck with the program through the 1990s, but in 2000 two more V-22s
crashed, killing 23 Marines. With that, the Marines grounded the
Osprey for 18 months.

Probes into the deadly 2000 crashes revealed that in a rush to deploy
the aircraft, the Marines had dangerously cut corners in their testing
program. The number of different flight configurations - varying
speed, weight and other factors - flown by test pilots to ensure safe
landings was reduced by half to meet deadlines. Then only two-thirds
of those curtailed flight tests were conducted. That trend continues:
while a 2004 plan called for 131 hours of nighttime flight tests, the
Marines managed to run only 33 on the Osprey. Why the shortcuts?
Problems with a gearbox kept many V-22s and pilots grounded. That
meant many pilots lacked the hours required to qualify for night
flying. Similarly, sea trials were curtailed because the ship
designated to assist with Osprey tests could spare only 10 of the 21
days needed.

There's also been controversy over a sandstorm test for the craft. The
V-22's tendency to generate a dust storm when it lands in desert-like
terrain wasn't examined because "an unusually wet spring resulted in a
large amount of vegetation that prevented severe brownouts during
landing attempts," the Pentagon's top tester noted. But the program
continued, albeit with a caution about the aircraft's ability to fly
in dusty conditions.

The Engine-Failure Problem

After the 2000 grounding, Osprey pilots were told to fly less
aggressively, which critics say is the only reason no V-22 has crashed
since. "They keep talking about all the things it can do, but little
by little its operations are being more and more restricted," says
Philip Coyle, who monitored the V-22's development as the Pentagon's
top weapons tester from 1994 to 2001. The V-22 can fly safely "if used
like a truck, carrying people from one safe area to another safe
area," he says. "But I don't see them using it in combat situations
where they will have to do a lot of maneuvering."

The Marines contend that the V-22 is an assault aircraft and that no
pilot who finds himself dodging bullets is going to fly it gently.
"The airplane is incredibly maneuverable," says Lieut. Colonel Anthony
(Buddy) Bianca, a veteran V-22 pilot. But the dirty little secret
about an aircraft that combines the best features of an airplane and a
helicopter is that it combines their worst features too. The V-22
can't glide as well as an airplane, and it can't hover as well as a
helicopter. If a V-22 loses power while flying like an airplane, it
should be able to glide to a rough but survivable belly-flop landing.
Its huge, 19-ft.-long (5.7 m) rotors are designed to rip into shreds
rather than break apart and tear into the fuselage. But all bets are
off if a V-22 is flying like a helicopter, heading in or out of a
landing zone, and its engines are disabled by enemy fire or mechanical
malfunction.

As originally designed, the V-22 was supposed to survive a loss of
engine power when flying like a helicopter by autorotating toward the
ground, just as maple seeds do in the fall. Autorotation, which turns
a normally soft touchdown into an very hard emergency landing, is at
least survivable. It became clear, however, that the design of the
Osprey, adjusted many times over, simply could not accommodate the
maneuver. The Pentagon slowly conceded the point. "The lack of proven
autorotative capability is cause for concern in tilt-rotor aircraft,"
a 1999 report warned. Two years later, a second study cautioned that
the V-22's "probability of a successful autorotational landing ... is
very low." Unable to rewrite the laws of physics, the Pentagon
determined that the ability to perform the safety procedure was no
longer a necessary requirement and crossed it off the V-22's must-have
list. "An autorotation to a safe landing is no longer a formal
requirement," a 2002 Pentagon report said. "The deletion of safe
autorotation landing as a ... requirement recognizes the hybrid nature
of the tilt-rotor."

Indeed it does, but that doesn't make the aircraft any safer. The
plane's backers said that the chance of a dual-engine failure was so
rare that it shouldn't be of concern. Yet the flight manual lists a
variety of things that can cause both engines to fail, including
"contaminated fuel ... software malfunctions or battle damage." The
lone attempted V-22 autorotation "failed miserably," according to an
internal 2003 report, obtained by TIME, written by the Institute for
Defense Analyses, an in-house Pentagon think tank. "The test data
indicate that the aircraft would have impacted the ground at a ...
fatal rate of descent."

That prospect doesn't concern some V-22 pilots, who believe they'll
have the altitude and time to convert the aircraft into its airplane
mode and hunt for a landing strip if they lose power. "We can turn it
into a plane and glide it down, just like a C-130," Captain Justin
(Moon) McKinney, a V-22 pilot, said from his North Carolina base as he
got ready to head to Iraq. "I have absolutely no safety concerns with
this aircraft, flying it here or in Iraq."

Helicopter expert Rex Rivolo, who called the decision to deploy the
V-22 without proven autorotation capability "unconscionable" in that
confidential 2003 Pentagon study, declined to be interviewed. But in
his report, Rivolo noted that up to 90% of the helicopters lost in the
Vietnam War were in their final approach to landing when they were hit
by enemy ground fire. About half of those were able to autorotate
safely to the ground, "thereby saving the crews," Rivolo wrote. "Such
events in V-22 would all be fatal."

Faced with killing the program - or possibly killing those aboard the
V-22 - the Marines have opted to save the plane and have largely
shifted responsibility for surviving such a catastrophe from the
designers to the pilots. While the engineers spent years vainly trying
to solve the problem, pilots aboard a stricken V-22 will have just
seconds to react. But tellingly, pilots have never practiced the
maneuver outside the simulator - the flight manual forbids it - and
even in simulators the results have been less than reassuring. "In
simulations," the flight manual warns, "the outcome of the landings
varied widely due to the extreme sensitivity to pilot technique and
timing." The director of the Pentagon's testing office, in a 2005
report, put it more bluntly. If power is lost when a V-22 is flying
like a helicopter below 1,600 ft. (490 m), he said, emergency landings
"are not likely to be survivable."

The Pea-Shooter Problem

While the aerodynamics of autorotation may be challenging for
outsiders to grasp, a second decision - sending the V-22 into combat
armed with only a tiny gun, pointing backward - is something anyone
can understand. The Pentagon boasts on its V-22 website that the
aircraft "will be the weapon of choice for the full spectrum of
combat." That's plainly false - and by a long shot. Retired General
James Jones, who recently led a study into the capabilities of the
Iraqi security forces, is a V-22 supporter. But when he ran the
Marines from 1999 to 2003, he insisted the plane be outfitted with a
hefty, forward-aimed .50-cal. machine gun. "It's obviously technically
feasible. We've got nose-mounted guns on [helicopter gunship] Cobras
and other flying platforms, and I thought all along this one should
have it too," he says.

The Marines saluted, awarding a $45 million contract in 2000 for the
development of a swiveling triple-barreled .50-cal. machine gun under
the V-22's nose, automatically aimed through a sight in the co-pilot's
helmet. "All production aircraft will be outfitted with this defensive
weapons system," the Marine colonel in charge of the program pledged
in 2000. The weapon "provides the V-22 with a strong defensive
firepower capability to greatly increase the aircraft's survivability
in hostile actions," the Bell-Boeing team said. But the added weight
(1,000 lbs., or 450 kg) and cost ($1.5 million per V-22) ultimately
pushed the gun into the indefinite future.

So 10 V-22s are going to war this month, each with just a lone, small
7.62-mm machine gun mounted on its rear ramp. The gun's rounds are
about the same size as a .30-06 hunting rifle's, and it is capable of
firing only where the V-22 has been - not where it's going - and only
when the ramp used by Marines to get on and off the aircraft is
lowered. That doesn't satisfy Jones. "I just fundamentally believe
than an assault aircraft that goes into hot landing zones should have
a nose-mounted gun," Jones told TIME. "I go back to my roots a little
bit," the Vietnam veteran says. "I just like those kinds of airplanes
to have the biggest and best gun we can get, and that to me was a
requirement." He doesn't think much of the V-22's current weapon: "A
rear-mounted gun is better than no gun at all, but I don't know how
much better."

The Marines say combat jets or helicopter gunships will shadow V-22s
flying into dangerous areas. And backers say the V-22's speed will
help it elude threats. It could, for example, zip into harm's way at
more than 200 m.p.h. (320 km/h), convert to helicopter mode and then
land within seconds. It could pause on the ground to deliver or pick
up Marines and then hustle from the landing zone. Various missile-
warning systems and fire-extinguishing gear bolster its survivability.
If it is hit, redundant hydraulic and flight-control systems will help
keep it airborne. Finally, Marines say, if the V-22 does crash, its
crumpling fuselage and collapsing seats will help cushion those on
board.

It's good that such protection is there. It's needed. For the V-22
continues to suffer problems unusual in an aircraft that first flew in
1989. In March 2006, for example, a just-repaired V-22 with three
people aboard unexpectedly took off on its own - apparently the result
of a computer glitch. After a 3?sec. flight to an altitude of 6 ft.
(about 2 m), according to the V-22's flight computer, or 25 ft. (about
8 m), according to eyewitnesses, it dropped to the ground with enough
force to snap off its right wing and cause more than $1 million in
damage.

There's more. Critics have had long-standing concerns about the poor
field of view for pilots, the cramped and hot quarters for passengers
and the V-22's unusually high need for maintenance. A flawed computer
chip that could have led to crashes forced a V-22 grounding in
February; bad switches that could have doomed the aircraft surfaced in
June. In March the Government Accountability Office warned that V-22s
are rolling off the production line in Amarillo, Texas, and being
accepted by the Marines "with numerous deviations and waivers,"
including "several potentially serious defects." An internal Marine
memo warned in June that serious and persistent reliability issues
could "significantly" reduce the aircraft's anticipated role in Iraq.
V-22s built before 2005, the report said, are fully ready to fly only
35% of the time, while newer models, like those in Iraq, are 62%
ready. But "sustained high-tempo operations in [Iraq]," the memo
warns, could drive down the readiness rates for the newer V-22s.

Into Iraq

Soon enough, the marines will know if those warnings are on target.
"My fervent desire is to get the V-22 into the fight as soon as we
can," General James Conway, commandant of the Marines, said in March.
"I think it's going to prove itself rapidly." But then he said
something that stunned V-22 boosters: "I'll tell you, there is going
to be a crash. That's what airplanes do over time." Conway is not
alone. Ward Carroll, the top government spokesman for the V-22 program
from 2002 to 2005, believes that six Ospreys, about 5% of the fleet,
will crash during its first three years of operational flight. Carroll
says new pilots flying at night and in bad weather will make mistakes
with tragic consequences. So he's reserving judgment on the aircraft
and suspects that many of those who will be climbing into the V-22 are
too. "I'm still not convinced," he says - echoing comments made
privately by some Marines - "that the Marine ground pounders are in
love with this airplane."

A former F-14 aviator, Carroll likens the V-22 to another Marine
favorite, the AV-8 Harrier jump jet. "The Harrier," he notes, "is
actually a good analogy for the V-22." Like the AV-8, the V-22 is a
radical aircraft crammed with compromises that may change combat
forever. And like the AV-8, it may also kill a lot of Marines while
doing little of note on the battlefield. Since 1971, more than a third
of Harriers have crashed, killing 45 Marines in 143 accidents. But
there's a critical difference between the two warplanes. Each Harrier
carries a single pilot, nestled into an ejection seat with a
parachute. But after all the debate about tilt-rotor technology -
after all the vested interests have argued their case and all its
boosters and critics have had their say - this much we know: within
days, a V-22 will begin carrying up to 26 Marines into combat in Iraq,
with no ejection seats - and no parachutes.


* Find this article at:
* http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1665835,00.html

On Oct 4, 3:08 am, Walt > wrote:
> > So it comes down to the ability to auto rotate versus lack of that
> > ability (Once you get hit...)?- Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> It is a confluence of things.
>
> If you try and fly it without escorts you'll get hit. You'll need to
> auto-rotate.
>
> If you try and descend at a constant rate into a zone you'll get hit.
> You'll need to auto-rotate.
>
> If you don't have effective armament on the bird you'll get hit.
> You'll need to auto-rotate.

Your statements make a false assumption that poor susceptability =
poor survivability. They are two different subsections of the overall
vulnerability of the platform. Flight parameters/performance can
certainly make a platform more susceptable to receiving hostile fire.
However the survivability of the platform is determined by completely
different parameters. Every hit does not mean a mission kill.

>
> I wonder how many retired Marines are making 2-3 times (or more) of
> their retirement pay to work on this thing.

Unfortunately probably about the same number as the Admirals that
pushed for NMCI .
:/

BB

I guess everybody has some mountain to climb.
It's just fate whether you live in Kansas or Tibet...

Kerryn Offord wrote:
> BlackBeard wrote:
>> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
>>> ***
>>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
>>
>> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
>> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
>> the survivability systems on the CH-46
>>
>>
> <SNIP>
>
> At least the CH-46 gets to auto-rotate if hit...

And the Osprey switches to powering both props off one engine and, in
plane mode, keeps on flying. Losing an engine while heavily loaded and
in hover would present power problems, but the pilot would still have a
chance to make a powered landing.
OTOH, if either bird loses a *prop* in hover, they're both equally
screwed. The Osprey would probably be able to survive losing one prop
in "plane" mode, whereas the CH-46 would still be screwed, but most
helicopter combat losses take place in/near LZs. so the overall effect
of the Osprey's superior survivability in this flight regime probably
doesn't shift the overall survivability numbers much. But every bit helps.

> And comparing the "brand new" V-22 with the CH-46 which is how old? (And
> last up-graded?) says a lot for just how good the V-22 must be...

The Osprey is intended to replace the 46s, so the comparison is not
inappropriate. Also, in hover mode the Osprey is more similar to a
CH-46 than most other helicopters due to the dual-rotor configuration,
so some comparisons are better made against the more similar airframe.

> How does it compare with a modern military helicopter? Heck, how does it
> compare in survivability with even a Blackhawk?

The Osprey probably has better survivability against engine hits, since
its engines are so far apart and the props are cross-connected at all
times, IIRC. A serious engine hit or prop hit while in low hover will
probably be equally bad for both airframes (although the prop
cross-connect might make a survivable landing more possible for the
Osprey), but in plane mode the Osprey probably has better odds -- the BH
might be able to autorotate (though I've heard from some pilots that the
BH autorotates about the way a B-52 glides), but the Osprey has a decent
chance of staying airborne. The Osprey lacks a vulnerable tail rotor,
though as I mentioned above it shares the CH-46's vulnerability to
single-rotor/engine loss while in hover.
Just from a perspective of geometry and aerodynamics, the Osprey
shouldn't be any more vulnerable while hovering in an LZ than the CH-46,
and probably somewhat less than the Blackhawk. Once in full "plane"
mode, the Osprey probably has somewhat superior survivability due to
higher speed, and the ability to fly on one engine. During
transition... hard to say. There might be a window of increased
vulnerability, but if so it won't be very long.

On Oct 2, 9:58 am, Vince > wrote:
> Walt wrote:
> > On Oct 2, 2:48?am, Roger Conroy > wrote:
> >> BlackBeard wrote:
> >>> On Oct 1, 6:11 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> >>>> ***
> >>>> Maybe no more vulnerable to being shot at.. but the effect of being hit?
> >>> Although there are no perfect survivability systems out there, the
> >>> systems on the Osprey are 1) more numerous and 2) more advanced, than
> >>> the survivability systems on the CH-46
> >>>> <SNIP>
> >>>> If it has a cobra escort.. Well.. It loses it's altitude/ speed
> >>>> advantage over alternative modern helicopters..
> >>> Rendevous scenario. The Cobras launch from a forward base and meet at
> >>> the LZ with the Osprey which has travelled from a base further away.
> >>> BB
> >> Is the Cobra really the only possible escort?
> >> I'm thinking that the AV-8 could do a pretty decent job during the
> >> high speed transit phase.
>
> >> Roger- Hide quoted text -
>
> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> > AV-8's go too fast to really see what is on the ground. An AV-8 can't
> > supress a treeline the way a Cobra can.
>
> > I recall reading in the Marine Corps Gazette back in the early 1980's
> > what you've seen me post:
>
> > 1. Doesn't matter what the range and speed of the V-22 is. It is
> > limited to the range and speed of the escorts
>
> > 2. The V-22 needs guns of its own, and not one that fires backwards
> > either. If the rotors are tilted forward then no door gunner can get
> > a useful firing arc forward due to the arc of the rotors.
>
> > 3. A chin turret was discussed (being the only reasonable option) but
> > that was eliminated due to cost.
>
> > I remember seeing this info in the MCG about 25 years ago.
>
> > The freaking thing is a grotesque boondoggle. It will never be
> > anything else.
>
> > I posted a video of a V-22 crash and some of the info I am posting now
> > on the website togetherweserved.com, which is for Marines only, and I
> > was banned within 24 hours.
>
> > Walt
>
> The chin turret is not just a question of cost. It uses about 10-15% of
> the already small payload and also "unbalances" the aircraft
>
> Vince


> The bucket made the cover of Time too.
>
> http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1665835,00.html
>
> Wednesday, Sep. 26, 2007
> V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame
> By Mark Thompson
>
> It's hard to imagine an American weapons program so fraught with
> problems that Dick Cheney would try repeatedly to cancel it - hard,
> that is, until you get to know the Osprey. As Defense Secretary under
> George H.W. Bush, Cheney tried four times to kill the Marine Corps's
> ungainly tilt-rotor aircraft. Four times he failed. Cheney found the
> arguments for the combat troop carrier unpersuasive and its problems
> irredeemable. "Given the risk we face from a military standpoint,
> given the areas where we think the priorities ought to be, the V-22 is
> not at the top of the list," he told a Senate committee in 1989. "It
> came out at the bottom of the list, and for that reason, I decided to
> terminate it." But the Osprey proved impossible to kill, thanks to
> lawmakers who rescued it from Cheney's ax time and again because of
> the home-district money that came with it - and to the irresistible
> notion that American engineers had found a way to improve on another
> great aviation breakthrough, the helicopter.
>
> Now the aircraft that flies like an airplane but takes off and lands
> like a chopper is about to make its combat debut in Iraq. It has been
> a long, strange trip: the V-22 has been 25 years in development, more
> than twice as long as the Apollo program that put men on the moon.
> V-22 crashes have claimed the lives of 30 men - 10 times the lunar
> program's toll - all before the plane has seen combat. The Pentagon
> has put $20 billion into the Osprey and expects to spend an additional
> $35 billion before the program is finished. In exchange, the Marines,
> Navy and Air Force will get 458 aircraft, averaging $119 million per
> copy.
>
> The saga of the V-22 - the battles over its future on Capitol Hill, a
> performance record that is spotty at best, a long, determined quest by
> the Marines to get what they wanted - demonstrates how Washington
> works (or, rather, doesn't). It exposes the compromises that are made
> when narrow interests collide with common sense. It is a tale that
> shows how the system fails at its most significant task, by placing in
> jeopardy those we count on to protect us. For even at a stratospheric
> price, the V-22 is going into combat shorthanded. As a result of
> decisions the Marine Corps made over the past decade, the aircraft
> lacks a heavy-duty, forward-mounted machine gun to lay down
> suppressing fire against forces that will surely try to shoot it down.
> And if the plane's two engines are disabled by enemy fire or
> mechanical trouble while it's hovering, the V-22 lacks a helicopter's
> ability to coast roughly to the ground - something that often saved
> lives in Vietnam. In 2002 the Marines abandoned the requirement that
> the planes be capable of autorotating (as the maneuver is called),
> with unpowered but spinning helicopter blades slowly letting the
> aircraft land safely. That decision, a top Pentagon aviation
> consultant wrote in a confidential 2003 report obtained by TIME, is
> "unconscionable" for a wartime aircraft. "When everything goes wrong,
> as it often does in a combat environment," he said, "autorotation is
> all a helicopter pilot has to save his and his passengers' lives."
>
> The Plane That Wouldn't Die
>
> In many ways, the V-22 is a classic example of how large weapons
> systems have been built in the U.S. since Dwight Eisenhower warned in
> 1961 of the "unwarranted influence" of "the military-industrial
> complex." The Osprey has taken years to design, build, test and bring
> to the field. All that time meant plenty of money for its prime
> contractors, Bell Helicopter and the Boeing Co. As the plane took
> shape and costs increased, some of its missions were shelved or
> sidelined. And yet, with the U.S. spending almost $500 billion a year
> on defense - not counting the nearly $200 billion annually for
> operations in Iraq and Afghanistan - there's plenty of money for
> marginal or unnecessary programs. Pentagon reform and efficiency are
> far less of a cause among lawmakers today than during the years of
> Ronald Reagan's comparatively modest defense-spending boom. "Almost
> every program the U.S. military is now buying takes longer to develop,
> costs more than predicted and usually doesn't meet the original
> specifications and requirements," says Gordon Adams, who oversaw
> military spending for the Office of Management and Budget during Bill
> Clinton's Administration.
>
> The Marine Corps likes to boast that it spends only a nickel out of
> every Pentagon dollar and makes do with cheaper weapons than the other
> services. The story of the V-22 belies that image: It's a tale of how
> a military service with little experience overseeing aircraft programs
> has wound up with a plane that may be as notable for its shortcomings
> as for its technological advances.
>
> First, some history. Because Marines deploy aboard ships, the
> service's chiefs have always hungered for vertical lift - aircraft
> that could take off and land from small decks and fly far inland to
> drop off combat-ready troops. As the Marines' Vietnam-era CH-46
> choppers became obsolete, commanders started to dream of an aircraft
> that would give them more options when considering an amphibious
> assault. The dreams intensified following the failed Desert One
> mission in 1980 to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran. In the course of the
> operation, three helicopters broke down, leading to an order to abort
> the entire endeavor, and a fourth chopper collided with a C-130
> aircraft at a desert base, killing eight U.S. troops. That sent
> Pentagon bureaucrats hunting for a transport that could be used by all
> four military services and prevent another fiasco. Reagan, who took
> office the year after Desert One, began to pour money into the
> Pentagon, particularly for research and design into new weapons and
> combat systems. The Osprey was born.
>
> Originally, the program was designed to churn out the first of more
> than 1,000 tilt-rotors in less than 10 years for $40 million each. But
> this was no conventional plane. The Osprey may cruise like an
> airplane, but it takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter. The
> technical challenge of rotating an airplane's wings and engines in
> midair led to delays, which in turn led to an ever higher price tag.
> As expenses rose, the Pentagon cut the number of planes it wanted to
> buy, which in turn increased the unit price. Citing rising costs, the
> Army abandoned the project in 1983.
>
> That left the relatively tiny Marine Corps footing most of the bill
> for the project - the V-22 accounts for nearly 70% of its procurement
> budget - and overseeing a program larger and more technically
> challenging than any the service was accustomed to managing. Sensing
> weakness at the Pentagon, congressional supporters, largely from the
> V-22's key manufacturing states of Texas (Bell Helicopter) and
> Pennsylvania (Boeing), created the Tilt-Rotor Technology Coalition to
> keep the craft alive, despite Cheney's opposition. They were aided by
> nearly 2,000 V-22 suppliers, in more than 40 states, who pressured
> their lawmakers to stick with the program. And so, despite Cheney's
> doubts, the Osprey survived.
>
> By 1993, as the Osprey program approached its 12th birthday and Bill
> Clinton became President, the Marines had spent $13 billion on the
> planes. None were ready for war. In 1991 one of the first V-22s
> crashed when taking off for its maiden flight - because of improper
> wiring. A second crash killed seven in 1992. The Clinton Pentagon
> stuck with the program through the 1990s, but in 2000 two more V-22s
> crashed, killing 23 Marines. With that, the Marines grounded the
> Osprey for 18 months.
>
> Probes into the deadly 2000 crashes revealed that in a rush to deploy
> the aircraft, the Marines had dangerously cut corners in their testing
> program. The number of different flight configurations - varying
> speed, weight and other factors - flown by test pilots to ensure safe
> landings was reduced by half to meet deadlines. Then only two-thirds
> of those curtailed flight tests were conducted. That trend continues:
> while a 2004 plan called for 131 hours of nighttime flight tests, the
> Marines managed to run only 33 on the Osprey. Why the shortcuts?
> Problems with a gearbox kept many V-22s and pilots grounded. That
> meant many pilots lacked the hours required to qualify for night
> flying. Similarly, sea trials were curtailed because the ship
> designated to assist with Osprey tests could spare only 10 of the 21
> days needed.
>
> There's also been controversy over a sandstorm test for the craft. The
> V-22's tendency to generate a dust storm when it lands in desert-like
> terrain wasn't examined because "an unusually wet spring resulted in a
> large amount of vegetation that prevented severe brownouts during
> landing attempts," the Pentagon's top tester noted. But the program
> continued, albeit with a caution about the aircraft's ability to fly
> in dusty conditions.
>
> The Engine-Failure Problem
>
> After the 2000 grounding, Osprey pilots were told to fly less
> aggressively, which critics say is the only reason no V-22 has crashed
> since. "They keep talking about all the things it can do, but little
> by little its operations are being more and more restricted," says
> Philip Coyle, who monitored the V-22's development as the Pentagon's
> top weapons tester from 1994 to 2001. The V-22 can fly safely "if used
> like a truck, carrying people from one safe area to another safe
> area," he says. "But I don't see them using it in combat situations
> where they will have to do a lot of maneuvering."
>
> The Marines contend that the V-22 is an assault aircraft and that no
> pilot who finds himself dodging bullets is going to fly it gently.
> "The airplane is incredibly maneuverable," says Lieut. Colonel Anthony
> (Buddy) Bianca, a veteran V-22 pilot. But the dirty little secret
> about an aircraft that combines the best features of an airplane and a
> helicopter is that it combines their worst features too. The V-22
> can't glide as well as an airplane, and it can't hover as well as a
> helicopter. If a V-22 loses power while flying like an airplane, it
> should be able to glide to a rough but survivable belly-flop landing.
> Its huge, 19-ft.-long (5.7 m) rotors are designed to rip into shreds
> rather than break apart and tear into the fuselage. But all bets are
> off if a V-22 is flying like a helicopter, heading in or out of a
> landing zone, and its engines are disabled by enemy fire or mechanical
> malfunction.
>
> As originally designed, the V-22 was supposed to survive a loss of
> engine power when flying like a helicopter by autorotating toward the
> ground, just as maple seeds do in the fall. Autorotation, which turns
> a normally soft touchdown into an very hard emergency landing, is at
> least survivable. It became clear, however, that the design of the
> Osprey, adjusted many times over, simply could not accommodate the
> maneuver. The Pentagon slowly conceded the point. "The lack of proven
> autorotative capability is cause for concern in tilt-rotor aircraft,"
> a 1999 report warned. Two years later, a second study cautioned that
> the V-22's "probability of a successful autorotational landing ... is
> very low." Unable to rewrite the laws of physics, the Pentagon
> determined that the ability to perform the safety procedure was no
> longer a necessary requirement and crossed it off the V-22's must-have
> list. "An autorotation to a safe landing is no longer a formal
> requirement," a 2002 Pentagon report said. "The deletion of safe
> autorotation landing as a ... requirement recognizes the hybrid nature
> of the tilt-rotor."
>
> Indeed it does, but that doesn't make the aircraft any safer. The
> plane's backers said that the chance of a dual-engine failure was so
> rare that it shouldn't be of concern. Yet the flight manual lists a
> variety of things that can cause both engines to fail, including
> "contaminated fuel ... software malfunctions or battle damage." The
> lone attempted V-22 autorotation "failed miserably," according to an
> internal 2003 report, obtained by TIME, written by the Institute for
> Defense Analyses, an in-house Pentagon think tank. "The test data
> indicate that the aircraft would have impacted the ground at a ...
> fatal rate of descent."
>
> That prospect doesn't concern some V-22 pilots, who believe they'll
> have the altitude and time to convert the aircraft into its airplane
> mode and hunt for a landing strip if they lose power. "We can turn it
> into a plane and glide it down, just like a C-130," Captain Justin
> (Moon) McKinney, a V-22 pilot, said from his North Carolina base as he
> got ready to head to Iraq. "I have absolutely no safety concerns with
> this aircraft, flying it here or in Iraq."
>
> Helicopter expert Rex Rivolo, who called the decision to deploy the
> V-22 without proven autorotation capability "unconscionable" in that
> confidential 2003 Pentagon study, declined to be interviewed. But in
> his report, Rivolo noted that up to 90% of the helicopters lost in the
> Vietnam War were in their final approach to landing when they were hit
> by enemy ground fire. About half of those were able to autorotate
> safely to the ground, "thereby saving the crews," Rivolo wrote. "Such
> events in V-22 would all be fatal."
>
> Faced with killing the program - or possibly killing those aboard the
> V-22 - the Marines have opted to save the plane and have largely
> shifted responsibility for surviving such a catastrophe from the
> designers to the pilots. While the engineers spent years vainly trying
> to solve the problem, pilots aboard a stricken V-22 will have just
> seconds to react. But tellingly, pilots have never practiced the
> maneuver outside the simulator - the flight manual forbids it - and
> even in simulators the results have been less than reassuring. "In
> simulations," the flight manual warns, "the outcome of the landings
> varied widely due to the extreme sensitivity to pilot technique and
> timing." The director of the Pentagon's testing office, in a 2005
> report, put it more bluntly. If power is lost when a V-22 is flying
> like a helicopter below 1,600 ft. (490 m), he said, emergency landings
> "are not likely to be survivable."
>
> The Pea-Shooter Problem
>
> While the aerodynamics of autorotation may be challenging for
> outsiders to grasp, a second decision - sending the V-22 into combat
> armed with only a tiny gun, pointing backward - is something anyone
> can understand. The Pentagon boasts on its V-22 website that the
> aircraft "will be the weapon of choice for the full spectrum of
> combat." That's plainly false - and by a long shot. Retired General
> James Jones, who recently led a study into the capabilities of the
> Iraqi security forces, is a V-22 supporter. But when he ran the
> Marines from 1999 to 2003, he insisted the plane be outfitted with a
> hefty, forward-aimed .50-cal. machine gun. "It's obviously technically
> feasible. We've got nose-mounted guns on [helicopter gunship] Cobras
> and other flying platforms, and I thought all along this one should
> have it too," he says.
>
> The Marines saluted, awarding a $45 million contract in 2000 for the
> development of a swiveling triple-barreled .50-cal. machine gun under
> the V-22's nose, automatically aimed through a sight in the co-pilot's
> helmet. "All production aircraft will be outfitted with this defensive
> weapons system," the Marine colonel in charge of the program pledged
> in 2000. The weapon "provides the V-22 with a strong defensive
> firepower capability to greatly increase the aircraft's survivability
> in hostile actions," the Bell-Boeing team said. But the added weight
> (1,000 lbs., or 450 kg) and cost ($1.5 million per V-22) ultimately
> pushed the gun into the indefinite future.
>
> So 10 V-22s are going to war this month, each with just a lone, small
> 7.62-mm machine gun mounted on its rear ramp. The gun's rounds are
> about the same size as a .30-06 hunting rifle's, and it is capable of
> firing only where the V-22 has been - not where it's going - and only
> when the ramp used by Marines to get on and off the aircraft is
> lowered. That doesn't satisfy Jones. "I just fundamentally believe
> than an assault aircraft that goes into hot landing zones should have
> a nose-mounted gun," Jones told TIME. "I go back to my roots a little
> bit," the Vietnam veteran says. "I just like those kinds of airplanes
> to have the biggest and best gun we can get, and that to me was a
> requirement." He doesn't think much of the V-22's current weapon: "A
> rear-mounted gun is better than no gun at all, but I don't know how
> much better."
>
> The Marines say combat jets or helicopter gunships will shadow V-22s
> flying into dangerous areas. And backers say the V-22's speed will
> help it elude threats. It could, for example, zip into harm's way at
> more than 200 m.p.h. (320 km/h), convert to helicopter mode and then
> land within seconds. It could pause on the ground to deliver or pick
> up Marines and then hustle from the landing zone. Various missile-
> warning systems and fire-extinguishing gear bolster its survivability.
> If it is hit, redundant hydraulic and flight-control systems will help
> keep it airborne. Finally, Marines say, if the V-22 does crash, its
> crumpling fuselage and collapsing seats will help cushion those on
> board.
>
> It's good that such protection is there. It's needed. For the V-22
> continues to suffer problems unusual in an aircraft that first flew in
> 1989. In March 2006, for example, a just-repaired V-22 with three
> people aboard unexpectedly took off on its own - apparently the result
> of a computer glitch. After a 3?sec. flight to an altitude of 6 ft.
> (about 2 m), according to the V-22's flight computer, or 25 ft. (about
> 8 m), according to eyewitnesses, it dropped to the ground with enough
> force to snap off its right wing and cause more than $1 million in
> damage.
>
> There's more. Critics have had long-standing concerns about the poor
> field of view for pilots, the cramped and hot quarters for passengers
> and the V-22's unusually high need for maintenance. A flawed computer
> chip that could have led to crashes forced a V-22 grounding in
> February; bad switches that could have doomed the aircraft surfaced in
> June. In March the Government Accountability Office warned that V-22s
> are rolling off the production line in Amarillo, Texas, and being
> accepted by the Marines "with numerous deviations and waivers,"
> including "several potentially serious defects." An internal Marine
> memo warned in June that serious and persistent reliability issues
> could "significantly" reduce the aircraft's anticipated role in Iraq.
> V-22s built before 2005, the report said, are fully ready to fly only
> 35% of the time, while newer models, like those in Iraq, are 62%
> ready. But "sustained high-tempo operations in [Iraq]," the memo
> warns, could drive down the readiness rates for the newer V-22s.
>
> Into Iraq
>
> Soon enough, the marines will know if those warnings are on target.
> "My fervent desire is to get the V-22 into the fight as soon as we
> can," General James Conway, commandant of the Marines, said in March.
> "I think it's going to prove itself rapidly." But then he said
> something that stunned V-22 boosters: "I'll tell you, there is going
> to be a crash. That's what airplanes do over time." Conway is not
> alone. Ward Carroll, the top government spokesman for the V-22 program
> from 2002 to 2005, believes that six Ospreys, about 5% of the fleet,
> will crash during its first three years of operational flight. Carroll
> says new pilots flying at night and in bad weather will make mistakes
> with tragic consequences. So he's reserving judgment on the aircraft
> and suspects that many of those who will be climbing into the V-22 are
> too. "I'm still not convinced," he says - echoing comments made
> privately by some Marines - "that the Marine ground pounders are in
> love with this airplane."
>
> A former F-14 aviator, Carroll likens the V-22 to another Marine
> favorite, the AV-8 Harrier jump jet. "The Harrier," he notes, "is
> actually a good analogy for the V-22." Like the AV-8, the V-22 is a
> radical aircraft crammed with compromises that may change combat
> forever. And like the AV-8, it may also kill a lot of Marines while
> doing little of note on the battlefield. Since 1971, more than a third
> of Harriers have crashed, killing 45 Marines in 143 accidents. But
> there's a critical difference between the two warplanes. Each Harrier
> carries a single pilot, nestled into an ejection seat with a
> parachute. But after all the debate about tilt-rotor technology -
> after all the vested interests have argued their case and all its
> boosters and critics have had their say - this much we know: within
> days, a V-22 will begin carrying up to 26 Marines into combat in Iraq,
> with no ejection seats - and no parachutes.
>
> * Find this article at:
> *http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1665835,00.html

On Oct 4, 1:33 pm, Jack Linthicum > wrote:
> On Oct 1, 4:33 pm, Mike > wrote:

>
> The bucket made the cover of Time too.
>
> http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1665835,00.html
>
> Wednesday, Sep. 26, 2007
> V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame
> By Mark Thompson
>
> It's hard to imagine an American weapons program so fraught with
> problems that Dick Cheney would try repeatedly to cancel it - hard,
> that is, until you get to know the Osprey. As Defense Secretary under
> George H.W. Bush, Cheney tried four times to kill the Marine Corps's
> ungainly tilt-rotor aircraft. Four times he failed. Cheney found the
> arguments for the combat troop carrier unpersuasive and its problems
> irredeemable. "Given the risk we face from a military standpoint,
> given the areas where we think the priorities ought to be, the V-22 is
> not at the top of the list," he told a Senate committee in 1989. "It
> came out at the bottom of the list, and for that reason, I decided to
> terminate it." But the Osprey proved impossible to kill, thanks to
> lawmakers who rescued it from Cheney's ax time and again because of
> the home-district money that came with it - and to the irresistible
> notion that American engineers had found a way to improve on another
> great aviation breakthrough, the helicopter.
>
> Now the aircraft that flies like an airplane but takes off and lands
> like a chopper is about to make its combat debut in Iraq. It has been
> a long, strange trip: the V-22 has been 25 years in development, more
> than twice as long as the Apollo program that put men on the moon.
> V-22 crashes have claimed the lives of 30 men - 10 times the lunar
> program's toll - all before the plane has seen combat. The Pentagon
> has put $20 billion into the Osprey and expects to spend an additional
> $35 billion before the program is finished. In exchange, the Marines,
> Navy and Air Force will get 458 aircraft, averaging $119 million per
> copy.
>
> The saga of the V-22 - the battles over its future on Capitol Hill, a
> performance record that is spotty at best, a long, determined quest by
> the Marines to get what they wanted - demonstrates how Washington
> works (or, rather, doesn't). It exposes the compromises that are made
> when narrow interests collide with common sense. It is a tale that
> shows how the system fails at its most significant task, by placing in
> jeopardy those we count on to protect us. For even at a stratospheric
> price, the V-22 is going into combat shorthanded. As a result of
> decisions the Marine Corps made over the past decade, the aircraft
> lacks a heavy-duty, forward-mounted machine gun to lay down
> suppressing fire against forces that will surely try to shoot it down.
> And if the plane's two engines are disabled by enemy fire or
> mechanical trouble while it's hovering, the V-22 lacks a helicopter's
> ability to coast roughly to the ground - something that often saved
> lives in Vietnam. In 2002 the Marines abandoned the requirement that
> the planes be capable of autorotating (as the maneuver is called),
> with unpowered but spinning helicopter blades slowly letting the
> aircraft land safely. That decision, a top Pentagon aviation
> consultant wrote in a confidential 2003 report obtained by TIME, is
> "unconscionable" for a wartime aircraft. "When everything goes wrong,
> as it often does in a combat environment," he said, "autorotation is
> all a helicopter pilot has to save his and his passengers' lives."
>
> The Plane That Wouldn't Die
>
> In many ways, the V-22 is a classic example of how large weapons
> systems have been built in the U.S. since Dwight Eisenhower warned in
> 1961 of the "unwarranted influence" of "the military-industrial
> complex." The Osprey has taken years to design, build, test and bring
> to the field. All that time meant plenty of money for its prime
> contractors, Bell Helicopter and the Boeing Co. As the plane took
> shape and costs increased, some of its missions were shelved or
> sidelined. And yet, with the U.S. spending almost $500 billion a year
> on defense - not counting the nearly $200 billion annually for
> operations in Iraq and Afghanistan - there's plenty of money for
> marginal or unnecessary programs. Pentagon reform and efficiency are
> far less of a cause among lawmakers today than during the years of
> Ronald Reagan's comparatively modest defense-spending boom. "Almost
> every program the U.S. military is now buying takes longer to develop,
> costs more than predicted and usually doesn't meet the original
> specifications and requirements," says Gordon Adams, who oversaw
> military spending for the Office of Management and Budget during Bill
> Clinton's Administration.
>
> The Marine Corps likes to boast that it spends only a nickel out of
> every Pentagon dollar and makes do with cheaper weapons than the other
> services. The story of the V-22 belies that image: It's a tale of how
> a military service with little experience overseeing aircraft programs
> has wound up with a plane that may be as notable for its shortcomings
> as for its technological advances.
>
> First, some history. Because Marines deploy aboard ships, the
> service's chiefs have always hungered for vertical lift - aircraft
> that could take off and land from small decks and fly far inland to
> drop off combat-ready troops. As the Marines' Vietnam-era CH-46
> choppers became obsolete, commanders started to dream of an aircraft
> that would give them more options when considering an amphibious
> assault. The dreams intensified following the failed Desert One
> mission in 1980 to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran. In the course of the
> operation, three helicopters broke down, leading to an order to abort
> the entire endeavor, and a fourth chopper collided with a C-130
> aircraft at a desert base, killing eight U.S. troops. That sent
> Pentagon bureaucrats hunting for a transport that could be used by all
> four military services and prevent another fiasco. Reagan, who took
> office the year after Desert One, began to pour money into the
> Pentagon, particularly for research and design into new weapons and
> combat systems. The Osprey was born.
>
> Originally, the program was designed to churn out the first of more
> than 1,000 tilt-rotors in less than 10 years for $40 million each. But
> this was no conventional plane. The Osprey may cruise like an
> airplane, but it takes off and lands vertically like a helicopter. The
> technical challenge of rotating an airplane's wings and engines in
> midair led to delays, which in turn led to an ever higher price tag.
> As expenses rose, the Pentagon cut the number of planes it wanted to
> buy, which in turn increased the unit price. Citing rising costs, the
> Army abandoned the project in 1983.
>
> That left the relatively tiny Marine Corps footing most of the bill
> for the project - the V-22 accounts for nearly 70% of its procurement
> budget - and overseeing a program larger and more technically
> challenging than any the service was accustomed to managing. Sensing
> weakness at the Pentagon, congressional supporters, largely from the
> V-22's key manufacturing states of Texas (Bell Helicopter) and
> Pennsylvania (Boeing), created the Tilt-Rotor Technology Coalition to
> keep the craft alive, despite Cheney's opposition. They were aided by
> nearly 2,000 V-22 suppliers, in more than 40 states, who pressured
> their lawmakers to stick with the program. And so, despite Cheney's
> doubts, the Osprey survived.
>
> By 1993, as the Osprey program approached its 12th birthday and Bill
> Clinton became President, the Marines had spent $13 billion on the
> planes. None were ready for war. In 1991 one of the first V-22s
> crashed when taking off for its maiden flight - because of improper
> wiring. A second crash killed seven in 1992. The Clinton Pentagon
> stuck with the program through the 1990s, but in 2000 two more V-22s
> crashed, killing 23 Marines. With that, the Marines grounded the
> Osprey for 18 months.
>
> Probes into the deadly 2000 crashes revealed that in a rush to deploy
> the aircraft, the Marines had dangerously cut corners in their testing
> program. The number of different flight configurations - varying
> speed, weight and other factors - flown by test pilots to ensure safe
> landings was reduced by half to meet deadlines. Then only two-thirds
> of those curtailed flight tests were conducted. That trend continues:
> while a 2004 plan called for 131 hours of nighttime flight tests, the
> Marines managed to run only 33 on the Osprey. Why the shortcuts?
> Problems with a gearbox kept many V-22s and pilots grounded. That
> meant many pilots lacked the hours required to qualify for night
> flying. Similarly, sea trials were curtailed because the ship
> designated to assist with Osprey tests could spare only 10 of the 21
> days needed.
>
> There's also been controversy over a sandstorm test for the craft. The
> V-22's tendency to generate a dust storm when it lands in desert-like
> terrain wasn't examined because "an unusually wet spring resulted in a
> large amount of vegetation that prevented severe brownouts during
> landing attempts," the Pentagon's top tester noted. But the program
> continued, albeit with a caution about the aircraft's ability to fly
> in dusty conditions.
>
> The Engine-Failure Problem
>
> After the 2000 grounding, Osprey pilots were told to fly less
> aggressively, which critics say is the only reason no V-22 has crashed
> since. "They keep talking about all the things it can do, but little
> by little its operations are being more and more restricted," says
> Philip Coyle, who monitored the V-22's development as the Pentagon's
> top weapons tester from 1994 to 2001. The V-22 can fly safely "if used
> like a truck, carrying people from one safe area to another safe
> area," he says. "But I don't see them using it in combat situations
> where they will have to do a lot of maneuvering."
>
> The Marines contend that the V-22 is an assault aircraft and that no
> pilot who finds himself dodging bullets is going to fly it gently.
> "The airplane is incredibly maneuverable," says Lieut. Colonel Anthony
> (Buddy) Bianca, a veteran V-22 pilot. But the dirty little secret
> about an aircraft that combines the best features of an airplane and a
> helicopter is that it combines their worst features too. The V-22
> can't glide as well as an airplane, and it can't hover as well as a
> helicopter. If a V-22 loses power while flying like an airplane, it
> should be able to glide to a rough but survivable belly-flop landing.
> Its huge, 19-ft.-long (5.7 m) rotors are designed to rip into shreds
> rather than break apart and tear into the fuselage. But all bets are
> off if a V-22 is flying like a helicopter, heading in or out of a
> landing zone, and its engines are disabled by enemy fire or mechanical
> malfunction.
>
> As originally designed, the V-22 was supposed to survive a loss of
> engine power when flying like a helicopter by autorotating toward the
> ground, just as maple seeds do in the fall. Autorotation, which turns
> a normally soft touchdown into an very hard emergency landing, is at
> least survivable. It became clear, however, that the design of the
> Osprey, adjusted many times over, simply could not accommodate the
> maneuver. The Pentagon slowly conceded the point. "The lack of proven
> autorotative capability is cause for concern in tilt-rotor aircraft,"
> a 1999 report warned. Two years later, a second study cautioned that
> the V-22's "probability of a successful autorotational landing ... is
> very low." Unable to rewrite the laws of physics, the Pentagon
> determined that the ability to perform the safety procedure was no
> longer a necessary requirement and crossed it off the V-22's must-have
> list. "An autorotation to a safe landing is no longer a formal
> requirement," a 2002 Pentagon report said. "The deletion of safe
> autorotation landing as a ... requirement recognizes the hybrid nature
> of the tilt-rotor."
>
> Indeed it does, but that doesn't make the aircraft any safer. The
> plane's backers said that the chance of a dual-engine failure was so
> rare that it shouldn't be of concern. Yet the flight manual lists a
> variety of things that can cause both engines to fail, including
> "contaminated fuel ... software malfunctions or battle damage." The
> lone attempted V-22 autorotation "failed miserably," according to an
> internal 2003 report, obtained by TIME, written by the Institute for
> Defense Analyses, an in-house Pentagon think tank. "The test data
> indicate that the aircraft would have impacted the ground at a ...
> fatal rate of descent."
>
> That prospect doesn't concern some V-22 pilots, who believe they'll
> have the altitude and time to convert the aircraft into its airplane
> mode and hunt for a landing strip if they lose power. "We can turn it
> into a plane and glide it down, just like a C-130," Captain Justin
> (Moon) McKinney, a V-22 pilot, said from his North Carolina base as he
> got ready to head to Iraq. "I have absolutely no safety concerns with
> this aircraft, flying it here or in Iraq."
>
> Helicopter expert Rex Rivolo, who called the decision to deploy the
> V-22 without proven autorotation capability "unconscionable" in that
> confidential 2003 Pentagon study, declined to be interviewed. But in
> his report, Rivolo noted that up to 90% of the helicopters lost in the
> Vietnam War were in their final approach to landing when they were hit
> by enemy ground fire. About half of those were able to autorotate
> safely to the ground, "thereby saving the crews," Rivolo wrote. "Such
> events in V-22 would all be fatal."
>
> Faced with killing the program - or possibly killing those aboard the
> V-22 - the Marines have opted to save the plane and have largely
> shifted responsibility for surviving such a catastrophe from the
> designers to the pilots. While the engineers spent years vainly trying
> to solve the problem, pilots aboard a stricken V-22 will have just
> seconds to react. But tellingly, pilots have never practiced the
> maneuver outside the simulator - the flight manual forbids it - and
> even in simulators the results have been less than reassuring. "In
> simulations," the flight manual warns, "the outcome of the landings
> varied widely due to the extreme sensitivity to pilot technique and
> timing." The director of the Pentagon's testing office, in a 2005
> report, put it more bluntly. If power is lost when a V-22 is flying
> like a helicopter below 1,600 ft. (490 m), he said, emergency landings
> "are not likely to be survivable."
>
> The Pea-Shooter Problem
>
> While the aerodynamics of autorotation may be challenging for
> outsiders to grasp, a second decision - sending the V-22 into combat
> armed with only a tiny gun, pointing backward - is something anyone
> can understand. The Pentagon boasts on its V-22 website that the
> aircraft "will be the weapon of choice for the full spectrum of
> combat." That's plainly false - and by a long shot. Retired General
> James Jones, who recently led a study into the capabilities of the
> Iraqi security forces, is a V-22 supporter. But when he ran the
> Marines from 1999 to 2003, he insisted the plane be outfitted with a
> hefty, forward-aimed .50-cal. machine gun. "It's obviously technically
> feasible. We've got nose-mounted guns on [helicopter gunship] Cobras
> and other flying platforms, and I thought all along this one should
> have it too," he says.
>
> The Marines saluted, awarding a $45 million contract in 2000 for the
> development of a swiveling triple-barreled .50-cal. machine gun under
> the V-22's nose, automatically aimed through a sight in the co-pilot's
> helmet. "All production aircraft will be outfitted with this defensive
> weapons system," the Marine colonel in charge of the program pledged
> in 2000. The weapon "provides the V-22 with a strong defensive
> firepower capability to greatly increase the aircraft's survivability
> in hostile actions," the Bell-Boeing team said. But the added weight
> (1,000 lbs., or 450 kg) and cost ($1.5 million per V-22) ultimately
> pushed the gun into the indefinite future.
>
> So 10 V-22s are going to war this month, each with just a lone, small
> 7.62-mm machine gun mounted on its rear ramp. The gun's rounds are
> about the same size as a .30-06 hunting rifle's, and it is capable of
> firing only where the V-22 has been - not where it's going - and only
> when the ramp used by Marines to get on and off the aircraft is
> lowered. That doesn't satisfy Jones. "I just fundamentally believe
> than an assault aircraft that goes into hot landing zones should have
> a nose-mounted gun," Jones told TIME. "I go back to my roots a little
> bit," the Vietnam veteran says. "I just like those kinds of airplanes
> to have the biggest and best gun we can get, and that to me was a
> requirement." He doesn't think much of the V-22's current weapon: "A
> rear-mounted gun is better than no gun at all, but I don't know how
> much better."
>
> The Marines say combat jets or helicopter gunships will shadow V-22s
> flying into dangerous areas. And backers say the V-22's speed will
> help it elude threats. It could, for example, zip into harm's way at
> more than 200 m.p.h. (320 km/h), convert to helicopter mode and then
> land within seconds. It could pause on the ground to deliver or pick
> up Marines and then hustle from the landing zone. Various missile-
> warning systems and fire-extinguishing gear bolster its survivability.
> If it is hit, redundant hydraulic and flight-control systems will help
> keep it airborne. Finally, Marines say, if the V-22 does crash, its
> crumpling fuselage and collapsing seats will help cushion those on
> board.
>
> It's good that such protection is there. It's needed. For the V-22
> continues to suffer problems unusual in an aircraft that first flew in
> 1989. In March 2006, for example, a just-repaired V-22 with three
> people aboard unexpectedly took off on its own - apparently the result
> of a computer glitch. After a 3?sec. flight to an altitude of 6 ft.
> (about 2 m), according to the V-22's flight computer, or 25 ft. (about
> 8 m), according to eyewitnesses, it dropped to the ground with enough
> force to snap off its right wing and cause more than $1 million in
> damage.
>
> There's more. Critics have had long-standing concerns about the poor
> field of view for pilots, the cramped and hot quarters for passengers
> and the V-22's unusually high need for maintenance. A flawed computer
> chip that could have led to crashes forced a V-22 grounding in
> February; bad switches that could have doomed the aircraft surfaced in
> June. In March the Government Accountability Office warned that V-22s
> are rolling off the production line in Amarillo, Texas, and being
> accepted by the Marines "with numerous deviations and waivers,"
> including "several potentially serious defects." An internal Marine
> memo warned in June that serious and persistent reliability issues
> could "significantly" reduce the aircraft's anticipated role in Iraq.
> V-22s built before 2005, the report said, are fully ready to fly only
> 35% of the time, while newer models, like those in Iraq, are 62%
> ready. But "sustained high-tempo operations in [Iraq]," the memo
> warns, could drive down the readiness rates for the newer V-22s.
>
> Into Iraq
>
> Soon enough, the marines will know if those warnings are on target.
> "My fervent desire is to get the V-22 into the fight as soon as we
> can," General James Conway, commandant of the Marines, said in March.
> "I think it's going to prove itself rapidly." But then he said
> something that stunned V-22 boosters: "I'll tell you, there is going
> to be a crash. That's what airplanes do over time." Conway is not
> alone. Ward Carroll, the top government spokesman for the V-22 program
> from 2002 to 2005, believes that six Ospreys, about 5% of the fleet,
> will crash during its first three years of operational flight. Carroll
> says new pilots flying at night and in bad weather will make mistakes
> with tragic consequences. So he's reserving judgment on the aircraft
> and suspects that many of those who will be climbing into the V-22 are
> too. "I'm still not convinced," he says - echoing comments made
> privately by some Marines - "that the Marine ground pounders are in
> love with this airplane."
>
> A former F-14 aviator, Carroll likens the V-22 to another Marine
> favorite, the AV-8 Harrier jump jet. "The Harrier," he notes, "is
> actually a good analogy for the V-22." Like the AV-8, the V-22 is a
> radical aircraft crammed with compromises that may change combat
> forever. And like the AV-8, it may also kill a lot of Marines while
> doing little of note on the battlefield. Since 1971, more than a third
> of Harriers have crashed, killing 45 Marines in 143 accidents. But
> there's a critical difference between the two warplanes. Each Harrier
> carries a single pilot, nestled into an ejection seat with a
> parachute. But after all the debate about tilt-rotor technology -
> after all the vested interests have argued their case and all its
> boosters and critics have had their say - this much we know: within
> days, a V-22 will begin carrying up to 26 Marines into combat in Iraq,
> with no ejection seats - and no parachutes.
>
> * Find this article at:
> *http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1665835,00.html

On Oct 4, 7:30?am, Typhoon502 > wrote:
> And yet different aircraft types all over the world fly from different
> fields and meet up in a point in space and time daily. You're so
> focused on making things fit the KISS rule that you're overlooking the
> reality of combat aviation for the past...oh, let's be generous and
> say 50 years. That's about how long routine air-to-air refueling has
> been occurring, right?

Routine air-to-air refuleing is routine. It's administrative. It's
done away from harm's way. You don't seem to have analysed this very
thoroughly.

And the KISS rule always applies.

Again - use of the Osprey without escorts makes assumptions that will
kill a lot of grunts.

The whole thing is based on the idea - "Well, if this is the way it
goes, we'll be alright."

You can't -assume- when it comes to enemy interntions or capabilities.

Walt

On Oct 5, 6:23 am, Walt > wrote:
> On Oct 4, 7:30?am, Typhoon502 > wrote:
>
> > And yet different aircraft types all over the world fly from different
> > fields and meet up in a point in space and time daily. You're so
> > focused on making things fit the KISS rule that you're overlooking the
> > reality of combat aviation for the past...oh, let's be generous and
> > say 50 years. That's about how long routine air-to-air refueling has
> > been occurring, right?
>
> Routine air-to-air refuleing is routine. It's administrative. It's
> done away from harm's way. You don't seem to have analysed this very
> thoroughly.
>
> And the KISS rule always applies.
>
> Again - use of the Osprey without escorts makes assumptions that will
> kill a lot of grunts.
>
> The whole thing is based on the idea - "Well, if this is the way it
> goes, we'll be alright."
>
> You can't -assume- when it comes to enemy interntions or capabilities.

No, but you plan based on your capabilities, your resources, and your
intelligence. And the Osprey brings a whole new set of capabilites to
the table, especially more speed. So what if you don't launch the
Ospreys when you launch the Cobras? They're all going to the same
place and time-on-target exercises are so old-hat that it's downright
silly to wring your hands over the question of whether the mission
planners can get the Ospreys to arrive in the LZ ten minutes after the
Cobras have commenced their attacks.

Plus, you also act as if there is no possibility of fast-jet cover
from sea or land, which is ludicrous. American ground forces have not
gone to war without air superiority since, what, Korea? WWII? If you
*have* to escort the Ospreys in, and all you have are Corps assets,
then task the Harriers to that role and let the Hornets team up with
the Cobras to beat up the LZ. I'm sure that the Task Force CAG will
loan a Hawkeye and a flight of Super Bugs to watch out for enemy air
threats.

On Oct 5, 8:46?am, Typhoon502 > wrote:
> On Oct 5, 6:23 am, Walt > wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 4, 7:30?am, Typhoon502 > wrote:
>
> > > And yet different aircraft types all over the world fly from different
> > > fields and meet up in a point in space and time daily. You're so
> > > focused on making things fit the KISS rule that you're overlooking the
> > > reality of combat aviation for the past...oh, let's be generous and
> > > say 50 years. That's about how long routine air-to-air refueling has
> > > been occurring, right?
>
> > Routine air-to-air refuleing is routine. It's administrative. It's
> > done away from harm's way. You don't seem to have analysed this very
> > thoroughly.
>
> > And the KISS rule always applies.
>
> > Again - use of the Osprey without escorts makes assumptions that will
> > kill a lot of grunts.
>
> > The whole thing is based on the idea - "Well, if this is the way it
> > goes, we'll be alright."
>
> > You can't -assume- when it comes to enemy interntions or capabilities.
>
> No, but you plan based on your capabilities, your resources, and your
> intelligence. And the Osprey brings a whole new set of capabilites to
> the table, especially more speed. So what if you don't launch the
> Ospreys when you launch the Cobras? They're all going to the same
> place and time-on-target exercises are so old-hat that it's downright
> silly to wring your hands over the question of whether the mission
> planners can get the Ospreys to arrive in the LZ ten minutes after the
> Cobras have commenced their attacks.
>
> Plus, you also act as if there is no possibility of fast-jet cover
> from sea or land, which is ludicrous. American ground forces have not
> gone to war without air superiority since, what, Korea? WWII? If you
> *have* to escort the Ospreys in, and all you have are Corps assets,
> then task the Harriers to that role and let the Hornets team up with
> the Cobras to beat up the LZ. I'm sure that the Task Force CAG will
> loan a Hawkeye and a flight of Super Bugs to watch out for enemy air
> threats.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Harriers and Ospreys are incompatible in their capabilities, and
Harriers can't scan the terrain and react the way a helo can.

The speed and range of the Osprey is moot because it is limited to the
speed and range of the Cobra. That is just bedrock.

The TOT scenario assumes that the Ospreys won't be escorted en route
and that is just an insupportable position. That too is bedrock.

I know some people want to argue just the sake of argument, but gee
whiz. Again, what I am saying appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette
almost 25 years ago in an article written,a s I recall, by two USMC
majors.

Walt

On Oct 5, 8:54 am, Walt > wrote:
> Harriers and Ospreys are incompatible in their capabilities, and
> Harriers can't scan the terrain and react the way a helo can.
>
> The speed and range of the Osprey is moot because it is limited to the
> speed and range of the Cobra. That is just bedrock.
>
> The TOT scenario assumes that the Ospreys won't be escorted en route
> and that is just an insupportable position. That too is bedrock.

Sorry, not buying it. You evolve your tactics to use your new
capability, you don't restrict your capability to stick to old
tactics. Saying that it can't be done because 25 years ago, it wasn't
anticipated is baloney. Heck, if you feel like you have to have a slow
eye over the battlespace, then put a pair of Predators along the route
to provide surveillance ahead of time. I bet that those Marines 25
years ago didn't factor that in, either.

Typhoon502 wrote:
> On Oct 5, 6:23 am, Walt > wrote:
>> On Oct 4, 7:30?am, Typhoon502 > wrote:
>>
>>> And yet different aircraft types all over the world fly from different
>>> fields and meet up in a point in space and time daily. You're so
>>> focused on making things fit the KISS rule that you're overlooking the
>>> reality of combat aviation for the past...oh, let's be generous and
>>> say 50 years. That's about how long routine air-to-air refueling has
>>> been occurring, right?
>> Routine air-to-air refuleing is routine. It's administrative. It's
>> done away from harm's way. You don't seem to have analysed this very
>> thoroughly.
>>
>> And the KISS rule always applies.
>>
>> Again - use of the Osprey without escorts makes assumptions that will
>> kill a lot of grunts.
>>
>> The whole thing is based on the idea - "Well, if this is the way it
>> goes, we'll be alright."
>>
>> You can't -assume- when it comes to enemy interntions or capabilities.
>
> No, but you plan based on your capabilities, your resources, and your
> intelligence. And the Osprey brings a whole new set of capabilites to
> the table, especially more speed. So what if you don't launch the
> Ospreys when you launch the Cobras? They're all going to the same
> place and time-on-target exercises are so old-hat that it's downright
> silly to wring your hands over the question of whether the mission
> planners can get the Ospreys to arrive in the LZ ten minutes after the
> Cobras have commenced their attacks.


read what you are writing

The Ospreys are the transports, the Cobras are the close in escorts.
1) you just lost the surprise element as soon as the Cobras take off
2) the only capability the osprey brings to the table is speed in
horizontal flight. in every other variable it is inferior to a
helicopter of the same horsepower.

As a result you have completely negated the speed advantage


> Plus, you also act as if there is no possibility of fast-jet cover
> from sea or land, which is ludicrous. American ground forces have not
> gone to war without air superiority since, what, Korea? WWII? If you
> *have* to escort the Ospreys in, and all you have are Corps assets,
> then task the Harriers to that role and let the Hornets team up with
> the Cobras to beat up the LZ. I'm sure that the Task Force CAG will
> loan a Hawkeye and a flight of Super Bugs to watch out for enemy air
> threats.

Again you lose the speed advantage , the only rationale for this one
trick pony

so that newcomers understand.

The ospreys speed advantage in horizontal flight is derived from
rotating the prop rotors to horizontal flight. However this put an
absolute maximum size on both the rotor and the cabin. Both are
inefficiently small The small "prop rotors" are inefficient in vertical
flight. They are far smaller than an efficient helicopter rotor driven
by the same horsepower. So the horsepower requirements are enormous for
the lift.

Because the horsepower requirements are enormous the osprey has the
Engines of a heavy lift helicopter and the cargo capabilities of a
medium lift helicopter.

The small rotors are driven faster which creates far greater down wash
as they land.

The tilt machinery and long drive shaft required to deal with engine
failure impose a permanent weight penalty. so weight control was critical.

The net result is that all of the "advantages" of the osprey only occur
at relatively long range. At short range it is inferior to a modern
helicopter in every possible way.

But the Cobra is not a long range aircraft It has a maximum payload of
about 3500 pounds of crew fuel and weapons. The more fuel loaded , the
less armament

So how do you mix the two?

Vince

Typhoon502 wrote:
> On Oct 5, 8:54 am, Walt > wrote:
>> Harriers and Ospreys are incompatible in their capabilities, and
>> Harriers can't scan the terrain and react the way a helo can.
>>
>> The speed and range of the Osprey is moot because it is limited to the
>> speed and range of the Cobra. That is just bedrock.
>>
>> The TOT scenario assumes that the Ospreys won't be escorted en route
>> and that is just an insupportable position. That too is bedrock.
>
> Sorry, not buying it. You evolve your tactics to use your new
> capability, you don't restrict your capability to stick to old
> tactics. Saying that it can't be done because 25 years ago, it wasn't
> anticipated is baloney. Heck, if you feel like you have to have a slow
> eye over the battlespace, then put a pair of Predators along the route
> to provide surveillance ahead of time. I bet that those Marines 25
> years ago didn't factor that in, either.
>

ok

Describe tactics for where the attack transport is faster and longer
ranged than the escort. Both are based on the same type of ship


Vince

On Oct 5, 9:24?am, Typhoon502 > wrote:
> On Oct 5, 8:54 am, Walt > wrote:
>
> > Harriers and Ospreys are incompatible in their capabilities, and
> > Harriers can't scan the terrain and react the way a helo can.
>
> > The speed and range of the Osprey is moot because it is limited to the
> > speed and range of the Cobra. That is just bedrock.
>
> > The TOT scenario assumes that the Ospreys won't be escorted en route
> > and that is just an insupportable position. That too is bedrock.
>
> Sorry, not buying it. You evolve your tactics to use your new
> capability, you don't restrict your capability to stick to old
> tactics.

Your argument is with the laws of physics, not me. Until you can get
the laws of physics to change, or the nature of war, the Osprey is a
giant useless boondoggle, at least for any missions that might involve
an enemy force.

Wat

Vince wrote:
[snip]

> The net result is that all of the "advantages" of the osprey only occur
> at relatively long range. At short range it is inferior to a modern
> helicopter in every possible way.
>
> But the Cobra is not a long range aircraft It has a maximum payload of
> about 3500 pounds of crew fuel and weapons. The more fuel loaded , the
> less armament
>
> So how do you mix the two?
>
> Vince

Some ideas.

1.Launch from different ships/airfields in different locations. Say
one north of the target and the other south of the target.

2. Launch at different times. The Cobras in the first wave and the
Ospreys in the second wave. This also permits the ship to have a
smaller flight deck.

3. Replace the Cobras with a long range aircraft for the close in
escort role.

4. Modify some of the Ospreys to carry guns rather than people. The
Ospreys can then escort the Ospreys. Appropriate guns and missiles
will have to be determined.

Andrew Swallow

Andrew Swallow wrote:
> Vince wrote:
> [snip]
>
>> The net result is that all of the "advantages" of the osprey only
>> occur at relatively long range. At short range it is inferior to a
>> modern helicopter in every possible way.
>>
>> But the Cobra is not a long range aircraft It has a maximum payload
>> of about 3500 pounds of crew fuel and weapons. The more fuel loaded ,
>> the less armament
>>
>> So how do you mix the two?
>>
>> Vince
>
> Some ideas.
>
> 1.Launch from different ships/airfields in different locations. Say
> one north of the target and the other south of the target.

which one is the close one ?


>
> 2. Launch at different times. The Cobras in the first wave and the
> Ospreys in the second wave. This also permits the ship to have a
> smaller flight deck.
>

no surprise and you have to be short range


> 3. Replace the Cobras with a long range aircraft for the close in
> escort role.

Which one? the F007 Magic Fairy Dust ?

> 4. Modify some of the Ospreys to carry guns rather than people. The
> Ospreys can then escort the Ospreys. Appropriate guns and missiles
> will have to be determined.

120 million plus a pop

Vince

On Oct 5, 12:52 pm, Walt > wrote:
> On Oct 5, 9:24?am, Typhoon502 > wrote:
>
> > On Oct 5, 8:54 am, Walt > wrote:
>
> > > Harriers and Ospreys are incompatible in their capabilities, and
> > > Harriers can't scan the terrain and react the way a helo can.
>
> > > The speed and range of the Osprey is moot because it is limited to the
> > > speed and range of the Cobra. That is just bedrock.
>
> > > The TOT scenario assumes that the Ospreys won't be escorted en route
> > > and that is just an insupportable position. That too is bedrock.
>
> > Sorry, not buying it. You evolve your tactics to use your new
> > capability, you don't restrict your capability to stick to old
> > tactics.
>
> Your argument is with the laws of physics, not me. Until you can get
> the laws of physics to change, or the nature of war, the Osprey is a
> giant useless boondoggle, at least for any missions that might involve
> an enemy force.

How on earth is it a violation of laws of physics to launch Cobras at
0330 and Ospreys at 0430? And I still want to know what genius of
planning would schedule the transports to arrive in the hot zone at
the same time that the first armed aircraft are arriving.

On Oct 5, 12:50 pm, Typhoon502 > wrote:
> On Oct 5, 12:52 pm, Walt > wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Oct 5, 9:24?am, Typhoon502 > wrote:
>
> > > On Oct 5, 8:54 am, Walt > wrote:
>
> > > > Harriers and Ospreys are incompatible in their capabilities, and
> > > > Harriers can't scan the terrain and react the way a helo can.
>
> > > > The speed and range of the Osprey is moot because it is limited to the
> > > > speed and range of the Cobra. That is just bedrock.
>
> > > > The TOT scenario assumes that the Ospreys won't be escorted en route
> > > > and that is just an insupportable position. That too is bedrock.
>
> > > Sorry, not buying it. You evolve your tactics to use your new
> > > capability, you don't restrict your capability to stick to old
> > > tactics.
>
> > Your argument is with the laws of physics, not me. Until you can get
> > the laws of physics to change, or the nature of war, the Osprey is a
> > giant useless boondoggle, at least for any missions that might involve
> > an enemy force.
>
> How on earth is it a violation of laws of physics to launch Cobras at
> 0330 and Ospreys at 0430? And I still want to know what genius of
> planning would schedule the transports to arrive in the hot zone at
> the same time that the first armed aircraft are arriving.

IIRC wasn't it SOP during WWII that fighter escorts would rendevous
with long range bombers at some point during the mission. They left
from different airfields, at different times, yet still often made the
rendevous and stayed with the bombers as long as they could (prior to
the long range escorts) and eventually throughout the flight while in
hostile skies.
With modern advancements in technology you would think if they could
do it back then, they can do it better now. Coordinating your escort
gunships to arrive at the LZ 10 minutes before the transports, from
different (closer) airbases, or leaving from the same base earlier,
isn't rocket science.

BB

I guess everybody has some mountain to climb.
It's just fate whether you live in Kansas or Tibet...

Typhoon502 wrote:
> On Oct 5, 12:52 pm, Walt > wrote:
>> On Oct 5, 9:24?am, Typhoon502 > wrote:
>>
>>> On Oct 5, 8:54 am, Walt > wrote:
>>>> Harriers and Ospreys are incompatible in their capabilities, and
>>>> Harriers can't scan the terrain and react the way a helo can.
>>>> The speed and range of the Osprey is moot because it is limited to the
>>>> speed and range of the Cobra. That is just bedrock.
>>>> The TOT scenario assumes that the Ospreys won't be escorted en route
>>>> and that is just an insupportable position. That too is bedrock.
>>> Sorry, not buying it. You evolve your tactics to use your new
>>> capability, you don't restrict your capability to stick to old
>>> tactics.
>> Your argument is with the laws of physics, not me. Until you can get
>> the laws of physics to change, or the nature of war, the Osprey is a
>> giant useless boondoggle, at least for any missions that might involve
>> an enemy force.
>
> How on earth is it a violation of laws of physics to launch Cobras at
> 0330 and Ospreys at 0430? And I still want to know what genius of
> planning would schedule the transports to arrive in the hot zone at
> the same time that the first armed aircraft are arriving.
>

how far away are each group
you lose surprise

Vince

BlackBeard wrote:
> On Oct 5, 12:50 pm, Typhoon502 > wrote:
<SNIP>
>> How on earth is it a violation of laws of physics to launch Cobras at
>> 0330 and Ospreys at 0430? And I still want to know what genius of
>> planning would schedule the transports to arrive in the hot zone at
>> the same time that the first armed aircraft are arriving.
>
> IIRC wasn't it SOP during WWII that fighter escorts would rendevous
> with long range bombers at some point during the mission. They left
> from different airfields, at different times, yet still often made the
> rendevous and stayed with the bombers as long as they could (prior to
> the long range escorts) and eventually throughout the flight while in
> hostile skies.
> With modern advancements in technology you would think if they could
> do it back then, they can do it better now. Coordinating your escort
> gunships to arrive at the LZ 10 minutes before the transports, from
> different (closer) airbases, or leaving from the same base earlier,
> isn't rocket science.
>

Sure fighters rendezvoused with bombers.. (But exactly how accurate was
the timing? Within minutes of schedule, at the appointed place on a map?)

When the escorts joined with the bomber stream they throttled back to
the speed of the transports so the missions could stay "together".. Of
course the escorts, being faster could also fly loops etc giving better
cover..

Now reverse the equation..

The escorts (helicopter gunships) rendezvous with the V-22s..

The V-22s slow down to the cruise sped of the helicopters... also
altitude.. Which kind of defeats the justification for the V-22.

The alternative is time on target.. gunships and transports arrive at
the LZ at the same time..

which means the V-22s have to transit without any escort (Unless they
get aircraft escorts?)..

The Helicopters should arrive ahead of the V-22s to suppress the ground
before the V-22s come in (The V-22 arriving first is contraindicated)..

The big problem is..

Once the mission is launched..

If for any reason the LZ is moved... You have to contact all units to
get them to (1) turn back for re planning, or (2) schedule arrival at
the new LZ...

Trying to schedule a new rendezvous once an operation has been launched
... Well.. I'm sure it would be an interesting exercise.. Lot's of ways
things could go wrong... (If the two units -- transports and escort--
were flying together.. No such problem..)

Do the V-22s circle at altitude until the LZ is considered safe?

Mike Williamson wrote:
> Walt wrote:
>> On Oct 5, 9:24?am, Typhoon502 > wrote:
>
>>> Sorry, not buying it. You evolve your tactics to use your new
>>> capability, you don't restrict your capability to stick to old
>>> tactics.
>>
>> Your argument is with the laws of physics, not me. Until you can get
>> the laws of physics to change, or the nature of war, the Osprey is a
>> giant useless boondoggle, at least for any missions that might involve
>> an enemy force.
>>
>> Wat
>>
>
> The nature of war has already changed, several times. As to the
> laws of physics, in which physics book will I find the law that the
> Osprey must be escorted along its entire path by an apache gunship?
>
> Also, while you're at it, please detail exactly which part of
> your vast military experience makes your opinion on the Osprey more
> authoritative than that of the Marine Corps.
>
> Mike

The laws of physics are that the Osprey is inferior to a helicopter
appealing to USMC "expertise"is the same as appealing to USN Battleship
expertise in the WWII era

Vince

On Oct 5, 6:10 pm, Kerryn Offord > wrote:
> The alternative is time on target.. gunships and transports arrive at
> the LZ at the same time..
>
> which means the V-22s have to transit without any escort (Unless they
> get aircraft escorts?)..

I want to know just how busy these escorts are expected to be.

> The Helicopters should arrive ahead of the V-22s to suppress the ground
> before the V-22s come in (The V-22 arriving first is contraindicated)..

Helos, Harriers, and Hornets, at the least. ANY troop carrier being
fired upon during a landing sequence means quite a few somebodys have
****ed up severely.

> The big problem is..
>
> Once the mission is launched..
>
> If for any reason the LZ is moved... You have to contact all units to
> get them to (1) turn back for re planning, or (2) schedule arrival at
> the new LZ...
>
> Trying to schedule a new rendezvous once an operation has been launched
> .. Well.. I'm sure it would be an interesting exercise.. Lot's of ways
> things could go wrong... (If the two units -- transports and escort--
> were flying together.. No such problem..)
>
> Do the V-22s circle at altitude until the LZ is considered safe?

They can stay further from the LZ or hot zone because they can go
further, faster when it's clear, which I'd think is an asset.

> Again you lose the speed advantage , the only rationale for this one
> trick pony
>
> so that newcomers understand.
>
> The ospreys speed advantage in horizontal flight is derived from
> rotating the prop rotors to horizontal flight. However this put an
> absolute maximum size on both the rotor and the cabin. Both are
> inefficiently small The small "prop rotors" are inefficient in vertical
> flight. They are far smaller than an efficient helicopter rotor driven
> by the same horsepower. So the horsepower requirements are enormous for
> the lift.
>
> Because the horsepower requirements are enormous the osprey has the
> Engines of a heavy lift helicopter and the cargo capabilities of a
> medium lift helicopter.
>
> The small rotors are driven faster which creates far greater down wash
> as they land.
>
> The tilt machinery and long drive shaft required to deal with engine
> failure impose a permanent weight penalty. so weight control was critical.
>
> The net result is that all of the "advantages" of the osprey only occur
> at relatively long range. At short range it is inferior to a modern
> helicopter in every possible way.
>
> But the Cobra is not a long range aircraft It has a maximum payload of
> about 3500 pounds of crew fuel and weapons. The more fuel loaded , the
> less armament

Helos are by their nature not long range propositions.

The Osprey is a worst of both worlds proposition. It's pessimal.
Worse even than the Canadair tilt wing transports of the 60s.

Helos are poor escort platforms, unless some bizarre hover-fight is
envisioned. A WWII recip fighter would be a better escort.

Sadly, some politician's kid is going to have to die in a horrific
crash-along with thirty or so other people-before the Osprey is
euthanized.

> The laws of physics are that the Osprey is inferior to a helicopter
> appealing to USMC "expertise"is the same as appealing to USN Battleship
> expertise in the WWII era
>
Sacred Vessels.

On Fri, 05 Oct 2007 13:39:29 -0700, BlackBeard >
wrote:

>With modern advancements

How do they differ from advances? Someone invented a new word while my
back was turned.

Casady

On Fri, 05 Oct 2007 09:33:26 -0400, Vince > wrote:

>American ground forces have not
>> gone to war without air superiority since, what, Korea? WWII?

The guys caught in the Pacific at the beginning of WWII didn't exactly
go to war, it came to them. What was the situation in the air when the
US troopsentered WWI?

Casady

On Oct 6, 5:35 am, (Richard Casady) wrote:
> On Fri, 05 Oct 2007 13:39:29 -0700, BlackBeard >
> wrote:
>
> >With modern advancements
>
> How do they differ from advances? Someone invented a new word while my
> back was turned.
>
> Casady

ad·vance·ment ( d-v ns'm nt) Pronunciation Key
n.
A forward step; an improvement.
Development; progress: the advancement of knowledge.
A promotion, as in rank.

BB

I guess everybody has some mountain to climb.
It's just fate whether you live in Kansas or Tibet...